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POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS

No. 1922

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BRIEFS

UNIONISTS ATTEND HAVANA CONFERENCE--Led by Secretary Z. Kramec, a URO [Central Trade Union Council] delegation left for Havana on 12 September to attend a conference for secretaries of socialist countries' trade union centers. The conference will negotiate issues of work safety, care of workers and coordinate activities of trade union centers from socialist countries in this area. URO Secretary B. Kacirek and chief of URO International Department E. Grochol bid farewell to the delegation at the airport. [Prague PRACE in Czech 14 Sep 81 p 1]

CSO: 2400/317

HISTORIANS ANALYZE NEED FOR GDR NATIONAL, PRUSSIAN HISTORY

West German Commentary

Bonn IWE-TAGESDIENST in German No 98, 6 Jul 81 'iwe-kultur' supplement

[Report from Berlin: "Propagation of Entire German History to Promote GDR National Consciousness." A translation of the East Berlin SONNTAG article by Prof Walter Schmidt cited below follows this commentary]

[Text] A stronger appropriation and propagation of all of German history has been demanded of the SED Social Science Academy by historian Prof Walter Schmidt. This was necessary, he wrote in East Berlin's SONNTAG (No 27, 5 Jul 81), to "consolidate the socialist German nation in our country." "Gaining a national identity" implied that the GDR citizens should know about their historic presuppositions. What was needed therefore was "a national history of the GDR written from the positions of triumphant socialism on German soil." Such a national history should have to face all of German history, chronologically, territorially and socially-structurally. No constriction of this "prehistory" of the GDR, going back a thousand years, to the German areas that today are part of it ought to be allowed. To the end of World War II it should also territorially embrace all of German history, even if the history of the GDR territory was calling for "essentially a much more thorough study" under the aspect of homeland history. Furthermore, the historic activities of all classes and strata of the German people should have to be examined with the question in mind of what of positive value was included in them that should become part of "our store of traditions." That was true even of a "discriminating appraisal of certain representatives even of the monopoly bourgeoisie."

The "central place" in GDR history propaganda, however, in Schmidt's view, should be occupied by the actual history of the GDR. In this context the GDR citizens should be made aware that between the FRG and the GDR there was nothing they had "any longer in common," in terms of historic experiences, norms and traditions. That would promote "most and most profoundly the development of a new, socialist German national consciousness."

SED Scholar on 'National History'

East Berlin SONNTAG in German Vol 34 No 27, 5 Jul 81 p 9

[Article by Prof Dr Walter Schmidt, director, Institute for German Labor Movement History, Academy of Social Sciences, SED Central Committee: "The Past Is Never Finished--What Must Be the Basis for a National History of the GDR?" For other

writings on related subjects by the same author see translations published under quoted headings in the following JPRS issues of this series: "Prussian Progressive Traditions, coauthored with Horst Bartel and Ingrid Mittenzwei (pp 20-33), part of "Prussian History to Be Accepted as Part of GDR 'Heritage,'" 76749, 3 Nov 80, No 1823, pp 16-34; "Nation Versus Nationality Concept Analyzed" (with Alfred Kosing), 74590, 16 Nov 79, No 1738, pp 44-60; "Historic Development of Socialist Traditions Analyzed" (with Helmut Meier), 72782, 7 Feb 79, No 1644, pp 15-24; "Development of 'Socialist German National Consciousness' Discussed" (with Horst Bartel), 71116, 15 May 78, No 1534, pp 46-55]

[Text] Anyone who attended the excellent Schinkel exhibition in Berlin, which to see one had to line up, will have noticed the exciting atmosphere and great interest of the many visitors who wanted to familiarize themselves with the creators of historic testimonials belonging to their immediate living environment. That was hardly any different with the Menzel exhibit in Berlin and the Gottfried Semper exhibit in Dresden. It is also shown by many citizens attending to cultural and historic traditions in their region, be it in the Erz Mountains or along the Baltic coast. These are by no means narrow-minded homeland history ambitions. These are needs resulting from the emergence of a new, socialist national consciousness. To satisfy and foster them is all the more important since thereby the citizens' ties with their socialist fatherland of today become closer and firmer.

If you wish, the debate about our attitude toward our cultural heritage, which started in the early 1970's in aesthetics and literary sciences and has recently been revived, has spread to our historical science and has been expanded into the question about our entire historic legacy. This debate was sparked and initiated, as one knows, by the demand of the working class party around the ninth party congress--most strikingly formulated by the SED Central Committee General Secretary--to tap all traditions without restraint. The central committee status report to the 10th SED Congress likewise indicated this orientation toward the broad range of our store of traditions. In his speech at the social science conference in December 1980, Kurt Hager provided important impulses by clearly indicating that in history the past is never finished but that history must always again be newly questioned in terms of any changing conditions and requirements. What is the whole point?

The starting point lies no doubt in the needs of the 1980's for ideological, consciousness-shaping work resulting from the new internal development conditions of socialist society in the GDR taking shape on their own foundations. Many factors should have to be mentioned in this context, but I want to confine myself deliberately to one aspect: the consolidation of the socialist German nation in our country. A most essential element in the formation of the socialist nation, especially in this phase, is the development of a socialist national consciousness. The citizens' identification with their socialist nation, the gaining of a national identity, which fully turns the GDR from a "nation as such" into a "nation for itself" (to apply the distinction Marx made for the development of the proletarian class to this area), also includes, along with many other factors--but certainly not as its least important one--this knowledge about the historic presuppositions of this nation of ours. Thus we need a national history of the GDR written from the positions of triumphant socialism on German soil. To that end, an unequivocal answer has to be given to the question about the historic ground of the GDR.

To become clear about that is all the more urgent because the bourgeois history ideology in the FRG--irrespective of all superficial allegations of a purported "historically grown German community of destiny"--leaves no stone unturned in grossly falsifying the GDR's relationship with German history in other ways. Since Karl Jaspers first tried in 1960 to attribute to the GDR a historic basis of its own that, for all intents and purposes, consisted of Prussian and Saxon history, bourgeois attempts at narrowly confining, in a cheap manner, the historic roots of the socialist German state to the history of Prussia never completely vanished. The political meaning of such constructs is obvious. As one can no longer help recognizing the state sovereignty of the GDR, the socialist German state is to be presented as such as a continuation of Prussia, or rather, is to be maligned as the successor to reactionary Prussianism. At the same time we have to take issue with a "Prussia Wave" that has for some time been going on in the FRG.

Clear Positions

In wanting to become serious about a national history of the GDR, we need a clear definition of positions--also, and especially, for taking issue with bourgeois misrepresentations, suspicions and calumnies. I shall try to outline a few basic positions. Three such positions appear indispensable to me.

Such a national history has to face all of German history, and this in three regards: first chronologically, then territorially, and third, socio-structurally. This means: this national history cannot and must not be understood, first of all, as a direct genesis and development of the GDR but must include German history since the emergence of the German people as an ethnic entity. GDR history does not start as late as in 1949 or 1945. Among our historic premises also is the entire "prehistory" of the first complete break with our reactionary past on German soil which the working people of the GDR accomplished through the socialist revolution under working party leadership. And that ranges far back into German history, all the way to the time of primitive society and the origin of the German people. Socialism on German soil has evolved out of the struggle, of almost 150 years, by the German workers class, but it is likewise rooted in the aspirations of the progressive bourgeoisie and the democratic lower middle class in the 18th and 19th centuries, the Reformation and the Peasants' War of the 16th, and in the peasant uprisings, plebeian revolts and anti-feudal heretics movements in the Middle-Ages.

Second, we must not permit this "prehistory" that lasted over thousand years to be narrowly confined to the German territories which today are part of the GDR. To the end of World War II it must also embrace, territorially, all of German history. The historic roots of our nation are of course not only to be found on German territories in which socialism has already become reality. It includes the operations of the German Peasants' War of 1525 in southwest Germany as much as in Thuringia; the activities of the South German Jacobines after the Great French Revolution and the Mainz Republic of 1793, the first bourgeois-democratic republic on German soil, as much as the Saxonian peasants revolt of 1790 and the big uprising of the weavers in the Silesian mountains, of 1793; the Silesian weavers' uprising of 1844 as much as the miners' strike in the Lugau-Oelsnitz region, in 1867, and so forth.

Equally from the socio-structural vantage point, we must, thirdly, also examine the historic work of all classes and strata of the German people and ask what it contains in progressive, positive elements that have to be included in our store of traditions. Socialism is the inevitable outcome of the entire process of history. But it is an entity full of contradictions the dialectics of which have to be comprehended as a whole. Even if the predecessors of socialism have to be looked for in the progressive classes of the people, yet their physiognomy and role become clear only if one knows what they struggled for and against.

Much remains to be done mainly where it involves the activities of exploiter classes in power or seeking power. On this field of our historic heritage, where progressive elements come most closely and inseparably combined with reactionary ones and frequently enough--if certainly not always--the latter dominate, wherefore it is more difficult than elsewhere to track what is worthy of our tradition, the historians' deliberations and discussions have largely concentrated in recent years. The debate about our Prussian heritage and the traditions inherent in it falls to a good part under this mode of questioning for us(even if not on a priority, let alone exclusive, basis). But it must, naturally, not merely involve the Hohenzollern rulers of late absolutism. Of greater interest to us ought to be a number of medieval German kings and emperors, such as Henry I, Otto I, Henry IV, and certain representatives of the German middle class (Luther, for example), and representatives of the liberal aristocracy in the 19th century. But we must also extend our efforts to appraise with greater discrimination certain representatives even of the monopoly bourgeoisie who were not only imperialists but also great technicians and scientists, such as Abbe and Siemens.

In short, putting it on a common denominator: our view that in the GDR the socialist German nation is developing, that is to say, a nation socialist in character and German in origin, has the consequence that this nation, in its consciousness, as a historic component of its own identity, as it were, has to come to grips with all of German history.

Special Interest

That all of German history until 1945 is our historic ground does not mean we could be indifferent, nihilistic, about the history of the German territories forming our state and nation today. On the contrary, our own view at German history asks for absorbing much more thoroughly the history of our own territory. What has happened here simply is more important to the GDR citizens than are events in Bavaria, Baden or Schleswig-Holstein. Integrating Prussia or Saxony with German history, appraising the Hohenzollern, the Wettin Dynasty or the dukes of Mecklenburg means more to them than do the Wittelsbach or Welf families. And, it seems to me, this specific historic interest is going to become still more pronounced, the more and longer the GDR develops as an independent state and national organism. This one can grasp already if one looks around. A great interest in it exists, as mentioned above with regard to the attendance of the exhibition.

Two things are needed to satisfy this interest:

First: This cannot be managed by simply returning to traditional local history. No narrow parochialism must constrain it. Historic events on our territories must, rather, be shown as part of German history in their significance in setting the stage for socialism on German soil.

From that vantage point, our special attention has to be directed at historic testimonials, processes and personalities that are tied in with the territories now parts of the GDR. They must be given priority in our national history. Looked at it like that, greater interest is warranted in the early feudal state organization under Henry I and Otto I, whose power centers were located in GDR territories, but whose work mainly had to do with enforcing social progress, embodied in feudalism, in the territory of today's GDR, and in the medieval cultivation of the land, which had a lot to do with turning our land into the cultural landscape it is today. To a still higher degree this holds true for Luther's Reformation which, together with the German Peasants' War, marks the first bourgeois revolution in German history, and its localities are found almost exclusively in the GDR territory. Special attention must continue to be paid to the activities of the Prussian reformers and, mainly, to the struggles by the popular masses for enforcing bourgeois progress in the last 18th and in the 19th centuries, such as the Saxonian peasants insurrection of 1790 or the centers of the 1848/49 revolution on GDR soil in Berlin, Dresden and Erfurt. Priority attention is warranted for the major areas of the revolutionary German workers movement in Saxony, Prussian Berlin and Thuringia. The Communist League had important bases in Leipzig, Berlin, Magdeburg and Schwerin. It was in Leipzig where the General German Workers Association was founded. In Eisenach the revolutionary Social-Democratic Worker Party of Germany was founded.

Secondly, however, we also need Marxist local histories. It simply is a fact that on today's GDR territory several territorial states existed in the past, for centuries. We are, of course, not interested in reviving provincial particularism. We must continue resolutely to oppose the anti-progressive elements in feudal German particularist statehood. Yet the history of Saxony, Prussia and the Thuringian and Mecklenburg states was more than just particularism and feudal reactionary misery. In those territorial states, social progress advancing toward capitalism did also prevail, and progressive classes were struggling against reaction. This heritage must mean something to us. Nor can the development of those states in their transition from feudalism to capitalism be gaged solely, or primarily, with the yardstick of national state centralization in terms of the German Empire as constituted in 1871. The debate that has started on the socialist society's attitude toward the historic heritage of Prussia also stands up against that background. It need not be explained that our coming to grips with what the territorial states have handed down to us through history must not be confined to Prussia but must also include the history of Saxony, Thuringia and Mecklenburg. We have to catch up a lot in this respect, no doubt.

Unmistakably

Third: what with all our emphasizing our relationship with all of German history and the particular place value of the historic heritage from the territorial states, GDR history proper must of course occupy the central spot in our history propaganda. For the development of our national consciousness it is by far the most important because this amounts to our own, unmistakable history which differs fundamentally from historic processes in the former Germany and, more importantly still, in the other, imperialist, German state. Here for the first time, in the real historic process, which is truly decisive for the development of historic consciousness, there is nothing any longer we have in common. Instead, both German states have

for over a generation already been following their own historic ways. That has essential implications for the consciousness development of the GDR people and the FRG people. Because history has been experienced differently, contrastingly, each already has significently different historic experiences, norms and traditions. Today, they must already be reprocesses and conveyed as historic values. In making people aware of them, they, among all values of historic experience, can most and most profoundly foster the development of a new, socialist German national consciousness.

Frederick II Biographer on Prussia

Leipzig LEIPZIGER VOLKSZEITUNG in German 15-16 Aug 81 p 11

[Slightly abridged version of interview with Dr Ingrid Mittenzwei, GDR historian, biographer of Frederick II; by Guenter Labudda, correspondent, Duesseldorf UNSERE ZEIT, organ of (West) German Communist Party (DKP): "Why Are We Preoccupied With the Prussians?" For a discussion of Mittenzwei's Frederick II biography see translation published under heading, "Prussian History to Be Accepted as Part of GDR 'deritage,'" in JPRS 76749, 3 Nov 80, No 1823 of this series, pp 16-34. For various references to other items of related information see translations published under quoted headings in the following JPRS issues of this series: "Clausewitz Accepted as 'Reformer and Patriot' in German History," 77538, 9 Mar 81, No 1855, pp 10-21; "West German Appraisal of GDR Historiography" (book reviews), 76871, 31 Aug 81, No 1914, pp 1-3; "Importance of National, Local Patriotism Explained," 76749, 3 Nov 80, No 1823, pp 35-39; "Values, Dangers of Regional Patriotism Disputed" (roundtable discussion, interviews with GDR academic and political personalities)]

[Text] [Question] GDR and FRG historians are increasingly preoccupied with the topic of Prussia. What causes that?

[Answer] There is no direct cause, such as an anniversary, excepting the Schinkel anniversary. Nor is the planned Prussia-Show in West Berlin, which has produced a flood of literature, the cause but a reaction to certain phenomena in the FRG. I find a whole bunch of causes of which the various "writers," the historians or journalists, may remain perfectly unaware.

Some reasons for the show planned for the summer of 1981 were mentioned by the former governing mayor of West Berlin, Stobbe, himself. Through the Prussia topic, with reference to the unification of the empire under Prussia's leadership, they want to assist in "keeping the German question open." That connects with the attempt to reappraise West Berlin by means of history. And finally they are likely to hope they can fight against a certain gloominess about the state by mobilizing the so-called "Prussian virtues."

The GDR's interest in Prussian history is old. It noticeably increased in the last 2 or 3 years, at the same time as in the FRG. In this contemporaneousness I find their only parallel.

Our Entire History Is Our Heritage

As German history was that of territorial states over long periods, our interest is concentrated on the areas that have become parts of the GDR: Prussia, Saxony, Thuringia and Mecklenburg. With a Prussia Wave that has nothing to do.

The greater interest the GDR population has in this part of our past expresses a greater consciousness of history and a broader understanding of our heritage. That calls for taking a clear standpoint of course on each individual part of this heritage. The ideological confrontation going on in this field also imposes further obligations on us.

[Question] In 1947, the Allied Control Council abolished the state of Prussia because it had "always been the buttress of militarism and reaction in Germany." Your biography of Frederick II, called "the Great," has also received great attention in the FRG. Not last because a highly discriminating picture of Prussia was drawn in your book. Must the progressive forces change their judgment of Prussia?

[Answer] You cannot suddenly turn black into white. In that respect the progressive forces need not change their picture of Prussia. The military tendencies that manifested themselves in the age of absolutism in many countries, in Prussia, for definite social causes, became a system that shaped everything. Via intermediate steps these tendencies continued into the 20th century. Which does not mean that militarism was the same in the age of imperialism that it had been in old Prussia. But one of its historic roots undoubtedly lies in Prussia.

Militarism in Prussia shaped the life of the entire population and characterizes an extremely important aspect of Prussian development but not all of Prussian history. Prussian history must not be confined to presenting the Hohenzollern Dynasty. Focusing on the other class forces that lived, worked, thought and fought in that state, whereby they contributed to social development, has for years been a particular concern of Marxist historians. That includes also examining how the ruling class at certain times, under the compulsion from objective necessities, contributed to advances and development.

[Question] You describe Prussia's King Frederick II as a man full of contradictions to whom initially bourgeois liberals related themselves and later, reactionaries of all shades. Many legends have grown up around him. Can he actually be included in German history as a great one?

[Answer] The designation, "the Great," comes out of the 18th century. Contemporaries called Frederick II the Great starting after the Silesian wars. They would admire the conqueror of Silesia, his military talent. Some may later also have thought of his domestic policy. Among the Hohenzollern Frederick II probably was the greatest. He surely towered above the mediocrity of all the other German princely personages. Yet the misuse of his name by the most extreme reaction all the way to the fascists counsels us to be cautious. I therefore, and for many other reasons, plead for a discriminating appraisal of that Monarch. In stressing his aggressive foreign policy and his conservative domestic policy, progressive tendencies must not be overlooked.

The Hohenzollern Dynasty Was Not All

[Question] Prussia and social progress--there are people that have trouble finding a common denominator for that. Which personalities, events, and developments are there that would give evidence for Prussia's share in making social progress prevail?

[Answer] If one accepts as a fact that Prussia must not be held to be one and the same thing as the Hohenzollern Dynasty, and that progress in a class society is a contradictory phenomenon, then one will find in the history of this state personalities, events and developments relevant to the enforcement of social progress: the representatives of the rising bourgeois class in the 18th and early 19th centuries, mainly its ideologists, the men of the Berlin Enlightenment, say, proclivities and propensities within the popular masses which, together with economic requirements, forced the ruling class to adapt itself to new exigencies in the transition from feudalism to capitalism, the liberal aristocratic reformers who significantly contributed to enforcing capitalist relations in Germany, the young workers class in the 19th century, and the developing workers movement.

Reaction and progress were not always diametrically opposed in the past. At times they were intertwined. Instead of many other events I would only remind you of the unification of the empire in 1871. Overcoming the national fragmentation it achieved was definitely an advance. It stimulated a rapid development of the capitalist mode of production and of a modern industrial proletariat and offered the working class a new basis to form on a national level. Along with it, however, Prussian reaction triumphed. Such a dialectical view, disclosing the limits to progressive developments, such as in the Prussian reforms, and examining phenomena which in their basic tendency were reactionary but possibly also had positive social effects, guards against any one-sided glorification or defamation.

No Equivocation About Militarism

[Question] Appraisals of the history of Prussia and the intentions connected with them do not conform, as between the FRG and the GDR. Which essential differences do you detect?

[Answer] In bourgeois historiography it goes in a number of different directions. Apart from clearly conservative historians, who unequivocally mean to paint a rosy picture of Prussian history, there also are more flexible forces that maintain a critical distance from Prussian history. Yet even between the latter and the Marxist historians there are of course unbridgeable contrasts.

If I--and this one should actually not do--disregard all those differentiations, a number of salient points are crystallizing at present in the debate. By overemphasizing the seeds for reform under Frederick II and underrating the activities in the class struggle, the history of Prussia in the late 18th and in the early 19th century, as many FRG historians see it, gives the picture of a continuously "peaceful" development, without any revolutionary leaps.

The tendency to rid Prussia of the odium of militarism finally continues and is led to a high point in the consideration of the relationship between fascism and Prussianism. There, by a one-sided stress on the "Prussian" resistance and by equivocating about many facts to the contrary, they then even "prove" Prussianism and fascism incompatible. All in all--without closing one's ears to voices of warning in the FRG--this amounts to the first large-scale attempt at a "rehabilitation" of Prussia since the end of the war, which in its extreme manifestations not by chance reminds us of what is being published in your country that paints a rosy picture of the Nazi past.

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PRINCIPLES OF AUTHORITY IN SCIENCE REVIEWED

Warsaw KULTURA in Polish No 26, 28 Jun 81 pp 4, 5

[Review by Wiktor Osiatynski of book "Authority in Science"

[Text] The concept of authority is derived from the Latin "auctoritas," which in a broader sense is respect based on authority. Authority is possessed by that person who awakens in us respect, esteem and trust because of his recognized superiority in knowledge, ability, experience and other values.

Authority is not always indispensable for living, or even for success. A top athlete or an outstanding actor can enjoy prestige based on an emotional response, but the professional achievements do not necessarily constitute a base for authority. If such people do acquire authority, it is most frequently thanks to their actions or attitudes inspiring moral recognition; anyone can become a moral authority, regardless of his profession.

There are at least two reasons why science cannot exist without authorities. The first is the economics of cognition. If every person were singlehandedly to prove all the truths that he uses in living, he would not get very far. He thus has to accept on faith that which previous generations have found as well as what his contemporaries have proved. He must trust their authority.

Similarly, authority is an inalienable component of the very scientific procedure that verifies knowledge transmitted by tradition and expands it to include new assertions. In the natural sciences, the most effective method for substantiating a theory is to confirm it experimentally or to fail repeatedly to refute it. Even in this case it must be determined whether the premises of a theory have been properly selected, whether the conclusions drawn from experiments are correct, and whether all arguments contradicting the new theory have been considered. Verification of theories is, therefore, to a large degree a question of faith, even in the natural sciences.

It is even more so in the so-called humanistic and social sciences, in which neither an experiment nor an attempt at falsification can be applied to a theory. The acceptance of the theory is largely a question of subjective evaluation.

Evaluations are an inalienable part of any scientific activity. Who, then, does the evaluating? The history of science rather unequivocally answers this question.

Those who are to be most trusted possess the most extensive knowledge and the greatest expertise in their specialty. In other words, trust an authority.

The emergence of authorities, their scope and type, the role and functioning of authorities in scientific communities and other problems with the concept of authority in science are the subject of a collective work AUTHORITY IN SCIENCE edited by Pawel Rybicki and Janusz Gockowski and published last year by the Ossolineum Publishing House. The book, containing papers by 19 scholars, resulted from the initiative of the Polish Sociological Society's sociology of science section. This book involves nearly all vital problems of the functioning of scientific authority and, at the same time, rather clearly reflects the atmosphere, the fears and the desires permeating our scholars in recent years.

Referring those interested in all these problems to libraries (the book was printed in a miniscule number of copies, even for the scientific community that it concerns), we shall pause at a few issues.

Authorities in themselves are neither good nor bad. They are necessary in pursuit of science: without them, there would be no major breakthroughs or daily scientific activity. At the same time, serious dangers are related to their existence.

Authorities are the elites of the world of scholars. Membership in such elites gives birth to certain privileges and guarantees an elevated status. Therefore, many would like to make their way into such an elite. Nor is it surprising that existing authorities desire to maintain their elitist position. Hence, on occasion, a sense of personal threat, as well as a tendency to conversation in science, arises in the face of new theories.

Such hazards are supposed to be prevented by the democratic and egalitarian nature of the very pursuit of science--the right to express one's own views and the right to have unhampered scientific criticism, with a collective assessment of rationalizations and arguments (of those who criticize as well as those who are being criticized) by a competent group of specialists.

One assumes that, thanks to the principles of conduct of scientific activity, the scientific community, if left alone, will produce the most appropriate and competent authorities, who will function in a manner most favorable to the progress of science.

But the scientific community is seldom left to itself.

Science as a social activity has always been tolerated, supported and maintained, provided that it furnishes specific benefits to society, more precisely, to institutions and persons controlling societal resources. Science has been required to have practical and ideological usefulness. The first is based on supplying technological, social, political and other solutions; the second, on supplying justification for actions of the authorities, that is to say, on transmittal of a part of the prestige and trust that science enjoys to those exercising power.

The second role assumed a special meaning in the current era of the cult of science. Scientific sanction has replaced religious sanction. Everyone who makes even the most minor decision wants it supported by the majesty of science. Every social organization wants to have scholars in its ranks, while political and social activists aspire to self-ennoblement by acquiring scientific titles.

The fullest consequence of this cult of science is the striving of institutions and persons exercising power toward control over the very organization of science and over the mechanism through which scientific communities function, including conferring titles and academic degrees. The detailed management of science, curricula, research programs and expenditures of institutions is conducive to such control.

This is dangerous insofar as a scientific career must be ruled by principles other than those governing an administrative career. In science, the basis of success most frequently is an open mind, a critical attitude toward oneself and others, and nonconformism and independence. A bureaucratic career on the other hand is conditioned by the very passing of time, loyalty and conformism toward the authorities. After the erasure of the border between science and administration, for the most part opportunists and careerists rise to the higher positions in science. Operating in a domain governed by the principle of authority, they try to obtain official proof of recognition, academic titles and awards. Exactly in this manner, careers without authority are born, in other words, alleged authorities.

A career without authority gives birth to uncertainty and a sense of endangerment. These feelings are often accompanied by envy, fear of open competition and attempts to take advantage of accumulated influence against probable competitors who threaten not only a careerist's authority but also his position. A careerist usually opposes not only novelties in science but in general anything that could undermine his alleged personal authority (e.g., "his" theory or method) and also that which he himself does not understand. He thus tends to limit the freedom of scientific debate and dampens criticism. In effect, criticism ceases to be a selective screening in the process of accumulating knowledge, becoming at best an instrument for personnel infighting.

Only in extreme cases of the disintegration of values, moral debasement and intellectual decadence do alleged authorities fight for privilege, money, fame, power and other benefits, ignoring public opinion. They usually try to gain social acceptance for their scientific achievements and intellectual and moral worth. That goal is served by the phenomenon of creating a scientific legend (analyzed in the already mentioned book by Adam Podgorecki).

Most frequently, legends appear in social and humanist sciences, in which it is naturally more difficult to assess precisely the merit and truthfulness of a theory; therefore, a greater role is played by authority. At the same time, precisely in these fields the strongest trends toward administrative intervention occur, not only in the organization but in the very substance of science. In these, too, alleged authorities are the most numerous.

Even an established scientific legend cannot, however, assure its creator of lasting glory and fame. This is pointed out by Krzysztof Pigon, who writes about careers without authority: "...this kind becomes the more abundant the softer is the voice of the scientific community vis-a-vis that of the institutions deciding about titles, awards and distinction. Such careers used to be made in monarchies by glib courtiers, servile types and sycophants. We know only too well that such careers have not vanished even now. Everyone could cite examples of such careers and, notably, they would be examples of our contemporaries. This is not surprising, since such careers wilt as rapidly as do the flowers on the graves of their creators, frequently even sooner. Nothing remains after these careers, just as nothing remains after mediocre poets, praised beyond measure during their lifetimes and forgotten even by historians of literature several decades later."

This provides a sensible caveat for careerists and a consolation for honest men. Yet when justice is meted out in the form of historical oblivion, the damage inflicted on science by parasitic elites of alleged authority is not checked.

The conditions hindering the formation of such oligarchic (that is, pursuing their own advantages) elites, which are inevitable in science because they have an aristocratic (that is, useful for science and scientific community) character, are the focus of all the papers in AUTHORITY IN SCIENCE. Abridged and somewhat simplified, these conditions can be defined in the following manner:

Science can develop only with freedom of expression and equality, as participants share equally in raising problems, searching for answers and criticizing proposed solutions. In bureaucratic administrations of all descriptions, however, a hierarchic structure and a consequent tendency to limit the freedom of criticism must exist. For this reason, the impact of the bureaucracy on purely intellectual matters and also on the organization of science itself should be minimized, in the interest of science.

Appointments should be replaced by choice; rotation should be instituted as a principle within the collegial management. A partnership, rather than supervisory relations, should exist between scientific administrators and the scientific community.

As Bohdan Suchodolski said in his preface to John Ziman's book, "Governance over science should not be--as, lamentably, often is the case--a reward granted to those who either have still not demonstrated their skill at the scientific workbench or have already failed."

From a purely institutional standpoint, the decentralization and competition among scientific institutions working on parallel problems would do well to guard the proper functioning of science, selection of proper authorities and "debunking" of scientific legends.

Of course, this would have to be accompanied by genuine, rigorous and impartial, rather than pretended, criticism along with free expression of independent opinions.

The healthy growth of science in general and of each particular discipline is predicated on science being untrammelled. The scientific community must be open to those who recognize prevailing views or scientific theories as well as those who question them. The latter also have a right to present their concepts for assessment by recognized authorities and to claim impartial evaluation.

Openness in science is also fostered by nonprofessional social criticism, especially in the humanistic and social sciences. This is particularly important when professional scientific criticism becomes enmeshed in the bureaucracy and overlooks the deficiencies of these sciences.

Of course, there is no need to explain further that the state of science is directly related to the general condition of society. It would be banal to try to prove that all official authorities in egalitarian and democratic societies find it difficult to abuse power because people reckon less with them or, in any case, are less afraid of them. In democratic systems, there is also a more frequent

concurrence of personal and official authority. In Science, democracy--just as the other mechanisms mentioned here--favors the emergence of an "aristocratic elite," in other words, the selection of proper authorities.

At this point, however, the question arises. What does "proper authority" mean? On what principles and what criteria should the scientific community itself select those proper authorities?

In general, there are no objections to a basis of a genuine scientific authority in knowledge, scientific achievement and skill in transmitting knowledge and developing new generations of scholars. Thus, authority may have its source in the discovery of a new theory as well as in the exemplary conduct of minor research, design of experiments that revolutionize science, ordering and systematizing of knowledge accumulated by others, lectures that fascinate listeners and laborious, systematic training of young apprentices in specific methods of scientific work.

However, a fairly clear distinction exists between the possibilities of assessing a scholar's achievements and genuine merit in the natural sciences and in the social and humanistic sciences. In the former, the criteria are more precise and the assessment is easier. In the latter, the criteria are more fluid; it is not easy to immediately distinguish a genuinely valuable theory from refined speculations bringing little new into science or from downright jugglery with words and concepts. Much more often the question arises in such cases; What measure of merit should be applied?

An unusually valid proposal on this issue was advance by Podgorecki in his paper on scientific legends. He concluded that in the case of social sciences a scholar's personality can become a valid criterion for evaluating substantive merit: "...an essential question emerges: How are we to determine in the social sciences which is the product of solid scientific activity and which constitutes infiltration of unverified concepts supported by a helpful legend? Of course, legitimate methodologies should provide the early screening, selecting out unsubstantiated and poorly verified concepts. As is known, the scientific method can carry out a negative selection. How are positive selections to be made? Apparently, in the area of the social sciences a researcher's integrity is of particular significance. An outstanding physicist or chemist may be a complete rascal, yet, despite this, he can accomplish major discoveries based on his having mastered scientific techniques. A scholar in the social sciences is not automatically distanced from the subject of his scrutiny in the same way. He is existentially involved in the research matter that he analyzes. Although in the area of social sciences a scholar may use research results obtained by others, he still draws from his own existential experience the principles for organizing these results in a comprehensive systhesis.

"A paradox of American sociology, notwithstanding all its excellence (visible, for the most part, in an unprecedented flourishing of empirical studies and in the pluralism of concepts used to interpret them) is that the individuals who are carriers of that sociological knowledge have relatively poor social and political experience. A scholar in the social sciences is, in a way, self-contained; he can justifiably interpret only those phenomena within the range of social realities that he earlier absorbed in his individual experience. In this situation, a scholar's integrity emerges as the principal criterion for assessing what is significant in the social sciences."

In other words, in the social sciences a total wretch, scoundrel, cynic or unethical person cannot be a prominent scholar. This contention deserves some reflection. Although at first glance there seem to be exceptions from this rule in the social-humanistic sciences, especially in modern times, the history of human thought (even of fairly recent times) has recorded a great number of major scholars with the integrated personality of a scientist and an honest man loyal to self-imposed ethical values.

In the nautral sciences as well, the researcher's personality is a significant factor. Even when someone becomes recognized as an authority solely on the merits of a major discovery or a revolutionary theory, an eminent and powerful personality is needed to accomplish such a discovery or to create and then uphold a new theory.

Podgorecki's stipulation combines the problems of authority in science with ethical requirements. This combination--though forgotten at times--is as old as science, society and ethics. The unity of truth, goodness and beauty derives from Plato. In the "portrait of a Greek scholar" traced by Jerzy Lanowski, the qualifications for an exemplary scholar include not only the curiosity and incisiveness of a scholar but also his moral attitude. Elzbieta Kaluszynska and Nina Krasko on the other hand, refer, to modern times when they say that "championing a just cause increases a scholar's prestige, even though he has already accomplished major scientific achievements." Jerzy J. Skowronski, in turn, while regarding the issue in moral terms, views the moral profile as a foundation on which all scientific authority is based.

As seen by Jan Szczepanski, a scientific authority is subordinated to ethical values found beyond science. "Authority in science," Szczepanski says, "is attained by persons with an intellectual horizon broader than that of others, marked by honesty toward their subject matter, courages enough to defend it and willing to adhere to the principle that it dictates."

This definition of authority generates significant conclusions as to how it is acquired. Authority is revealed, for the most part, in critical situations in which the interests of research and science, endangered by popular views or dominating forces, must be defended. A scholar who opts for the interests of research or scientific truth, who courageously propounds his views regardless of the risks, is the only type of scholar to gain authority.

Certain character traits favor this type of attitude and, consequently, an authority. Risks of this kind are likely to be taken by persons who are primarily geared toward the creation of an opus, rather than their personalities or careers. "A man who is geared toward upgrading his resume or promoting his career, Szczepanski says, "will, at times of crisis, rarely put himself uncompromisingly on the side of genuine values. A stance of this kind calls for total self-identification with one's work."

In brief, authority in science can be won only by a person more devoted to science than to his individual social position. To people of this kind, more than any other, we owe the progress of science.

Yet in this fact, a major difficulty for science is ensconced. Bona fide authorities are needed in science not only as outstanding scholars. They are also needed as defenders of values vital for science itself and for the conditions under which science is pursued. The more these values are endangered, the more such scholars are needed, because they are more competent than anyone else to defend them.

At the same time, however, "total identification with the work" and total devotion to its creation do not encourage outstanding scholars to social activity--frequently brutal and sometimes humiliating--that could favor the defense of supreme values. When relationships in science become increasingly poor, when science is subjected to increasing control, when the part played by spurious authorities expands, genuine authorities quite naturally become discouraged and retire from action. At such times, involvement alone becomes morally suspect. When those best-qualified retreat from public activity, the place due them is taken by others who can hardly wait for the opportunity.

This internal motivational contradiction presents a major problem and danger for science. Perceiving this contradiction could expand the scholar's moral accountability. Possibly, this accountability should include the responsibility for the status of science as well.

There is no mention of these things in AUTHORITY IN SCIENCE. This is not surprising, because the book was written at a time that did not foster involvement, a period when there was a proliferation of spurious authorities, careers with no authority and similar phenomena. The most urgent matter has been (and still is, perhaps) to restore conditions for the development of science. For these reasons, too, the book does not devote much attention to the dangers related to the existence and operation of even the most reliable authorities. This, however, is a separate topic.

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SPORTS AS TOOL IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Warsaw SPRAWY MIEDZYNARODOWE in Polish No 3, Mar 81 pp 123-138

[Article: Discussions - Sport in International Relations*]

[Text] Michal Dobroczynski: Perhaps the position of sports in international relations is not sufficiently appreciated, at least in public formulas that, in general, yield to the authority of other areas of international relations. However, sports have a colossal range of social and political action, and they influence friendships and international conflicts in a specific manner. Undoubtedly, there already is some scientific agreement on this; however, there constantly are many misunderstandings or conflicting opinions. Sometimes the position of sports in international relations is approached in an extremely idealistic way, and the merits in bringing nations together and pacifying feelings are the only things emphasized. But it is no secret that sports also lead to conflicts and temporary antagonisms. Finally, sports are treated as an instrument of international policy in almost all countries. This appears very clearly in some cases and not so strongly in others, but, overall, perhaps more strongly than at any previous time.

Sports also entail some consequences of a cultural nature, which to a certain extent results in transmitting certain defined patterns of life from one country to another.

Franciszek Ryszka: I am not really an athlete, although when I was young I participated in different sports. Now, like everyone else, I am a sports fan. I write a sports column twice a year for ODRA, which has 9,000 readers.

Much is said about the dependency between mass sports and record-seeking sports. Much is also written about the shortcoming of mass sports and the costly preference for record-seeking sports. The costs are calculated on the basis of stars; this is one of the favorite subjects of newspapers, and not just of sports publications. It is said that funds appropriated for mass sports were taken by stars. Perhaps they did take something, but not that much.

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*Participating in the discussion were Prof Dr hab Michal Dobroczynski, editor-in-chief of SPRAWY MIEDZYNARODOWE; Dr Franciszek Ryszka, professor at the Institute of History, Polish Academy of Sciences (PAN); editor Leslaw Skinder, sportswriter; Prof Dr Janusz Symonides, director of the Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM); and editor Maciej Wierzynski, writer; Dr Andrzej Ziemilski, writer, sociologist and worker of the Institute of Culture.

I was always interested in two mutual dependencies: that of record-seeking sports on mass sports, and vice versa. First, the extent of mass sports is an independent variable. The number of people who go in for boxing, skiing, skating, swimming, bicycling, etc., can be ascertained. Record-seeking sports would be a dependent variable. The first hypothesis is the higher the value of the independent variable, the higher, the dependent variable. There is an added high correlation: perhaps it is functional dependence.

However, that is not the way it is, and mass sports are not a recruiting base for stars. These are individual matters and there are no reasons for record-seeking sports to be developing from mass sports, without individualizing the case of each future star. Sports traditions and sports culture play a certain role but not the kind allowing the responsible education of exact dependencies.

Let us try the other way around. Let record-seeking sports be the independent variable and mass sports the dependent variable. Motivation and star models have an influence on the masses. In fact, the idea was expressed that when Fibak placed in the top 10 of world tennis, young people began to play tennis; this field is weakly adapted for mass sports in Poland. This argument was very frequently bandied about in newspapers and immediately negated because it had no basis; the thesis is a false one with seeming merit, because the very example of a star is a weak "factor" (in a methodological sense).

Leslaw Skinder: There is a dependence between mass and record-seeking sports, and conversely. There is no lack of examples of outstanding individuals who appear in sport disciplines not practiced in great numbers: not reaching far, already we mentioned Wojciech Fibak. But in most cases the birth of stars is a consequence of a given sport. We draw from the mass of those practicing, under what in our case unfortunately is a very poor system of selection, the most capable individual, endowed with such motor attributes as speed, vivacity, strength and proficiency, that help to climb the rungs of Olympus more quickly. An example is the nationwide young peoples' athletic meets. These mass spectacles helped to discover many subsequent Olympian medalists, world champions, etc. In turn, the international successes of stars influence the popularity and interest in a given sport discipline. Fibak's successes increased interest in tennis among young people as well as adults. Nationwide tennis court construction increased our playgrounds by some several hundreds in a short period. Let us recall the glamor of the Peace Race years. Almost every boy wanted to be another Krolak. Thus arose the followers: Szurkowski, Szozda, Jankiewicz and other splendid Polish cyclists. I could furnish a substantially larger number of examples. A dependence between mass sports and record-seeking sports does exist.

Lobroczynski: What is the international significance of record-seeking sports and of mass sports? What is the difference between them from the standpoint of external relations?

Ryszka: The international significance of mass sports depends on notions that there are "nations developed sports-wise." The word "sports"--which, note well, once meant a loose love game--is associated with Anglo-Saxons. In fact the Anglo-Saxons passed as an athletic nation; it was precisely this label that international opinion stuck on them very early. In LES SILENCES DU COLONEL BRAMBLE, issued right after World

War I, Andre Maurois writes about the difference between Englishmen and Frenchmen (the action takes place during the war): Frenchmen treat sports as a war, while Englishmen treat war as a sport. Possibly something like that was evident during World War I.

Andrzej Ziemilski: If one wants to the French to become enthralled about a sporting event, one must tell them that the national honor is involved. But if one wants to encourage an Englishman to go to war, one tells him that war is something like sport.

Ryszka: These notions functioned in relation of nation to nation, because notions can be expressed as behavioral motivations. Perhaps people are not "the way they are" but are created that way, and at a given moment they become that way. There is a grain of truth in each stereotype.

Record-seeking sports are very characteristic. The function of record-seeking sports in international relations is extrasporting, but much less important than those who organize, stimulate and administer sports and who want to exploit them for political purposes, believe is the case. The sports power--the GDR--is not rated highly by Western nation opinion while the FRG is rated highly. To be sure, these are the opinions of a certain cultural circle and are politically conditioned, but even among nations that ought to be for or against Germans in general, again, the GDR's attainments do not mean much.

Dobroczynski: However, thanks to sports, a given country can be come world famous.

Skinder: The GDR exerted a great deal of effort to obtain world recognition and its proper position in international relations. What would we say about the effectiveness of the weapon of sport when, thanks to it, the GDR began to be felt despite a conspiracy of silence. The leaders of that country bet on the dynamic development of sports. They knew that, despite various barriers, despite the avoidance by some nations of contacts with GDR athletes, those athletes would be registering their presence with their attainments during the European, world and Olympic championships. And that happened. That triumphal march toward the peaks of world competition began in 1968 in Mexico, where GDR athletes appeared for the first time as an independent, separate representation (previously, they had appeared together with the FRG as an all-German group). A hymn played a dozen or more times after Olympic victories is a promotion of a world breakthrough position. And sports were that breakthrough force. GDR rightly bet on sports, and its action paid off a hundredfold.

Janusz Symonides: Let us consider the role that sports play in internal and external relations. Sports, or rather record-seeking sports, can fulfill a defined function in international relations and can also be an element of confirming national identity.

Some sports disciplines are international, like soccer, but there also are national disciplines, if, at least, Mongolian wrestling. In the latter, the sport plays a certain role above all for a specific community and a specific nation. When I speak of sports as an element of international relations, I have international sports in mind, and, above all, record-seeking sports practiced in many countries.

Can such sports also fulfill positive functions? They can, for they can be an element of rapprochement between nations, the springing up of a feeling of a certain union, an element creating a feeling of belonging to given regions. If representation of one continent against another is presented, if our soccer player is included in a European team, if various European cup matches are played, then unavoidably we begin to think in broader, European terms. In addition, sports become an element for the formation of certain ties on a regional scale. From this viewpoint, perhaps sports are a positive element that brings nations together.

However, first, sports are rivalry. All international games do not bring positive results. Even without the famous soccer war, many international games can be cited where the public reacted in a highly unobjective, chauvinistic way; when this reaction was transmitted by radio and television, it created definite adverse reactions among listeners and viewers in other countries.

Sports functions can be positive, and usually are, but, in some situations, sports can also play a negative role.

Prof Dobroczynski said that sport is treated as an instrument of foreign policy. If the instrument is the means to attain a given behavior of another subject (country), it is doubtful that certain national goals can be attained through sports. Internally, yes, the consciousness that a representative of the country stands at the highest level gives satisfaction that can influence production results. Does it, however, influence others? Most often, it does not. In a certain sense a defeat can exasperate or irritate. Nobody likes to lose: the defeated party in one or more fields of sports does not have to feel at all defeated on other levels.

Ryszka: Sports can contribute to a confirmation of national identity. On the other hand, sports will not increase the country's international prestige nor increase the other qualities attributed to it.

Symonides: Perhaps sports might not arouse love for that country, but a certain prestige, yes.

Ziemilski: If mass sports and record-seeking sports in one country were to be treated as two independent variables that characterize that country, then we could talk about four kinds of countries: Those with mass and record-seeking sports; those with neither; those with mass sports but not record-seeking sports; and, finally, countries with record-seeking sports but not mass sports.

It is quite easy to assign poor African states to countries without sports. It is equally easy to find countries such as Switzerland or Sweden where there are mass sports, while record-seeking sports are marginal. There are countries with both: Finland, the USSR, perhaps the GDR. Finally, there are countries such as Poland where record-seeking sports are healthy but mass sports are deplorable.

What does the "image" of such countries look like on the outside? It is not a matter of indifference whether both elements or one come into play. If we were to study public opinion, would the English having good soccer teams in any way influence the evaluation of England's place in the economy and politics? Is confirmation of the Soviet Union's very strong position in record-seeking sports necessary to characterize that country?

Perhaps the role of sports in the image of the country is overrated? Finland's image is not the tradition of Viren or Nurmi but of order, advanced civilization and a rich heritage of customs.

However, on whom, outside one's own country, do record-seeking sports have an influence? Sports influence on the emigration, for example. This is a classic example for Poland. Sports found their way to Polish emigre centers before culture. The Polish Olympic Committee found itself in the United States amid groups that were not too friendly before others got there, before the groups became convinced about Lutoslawski and before Rozewicz began to be presented.

But one other matter comes into play. Did not Professor Ryszka exaggerate in speaking of nations? To whom are sports addressed--to nations? Is it the English people, its middle class, sitting in the shrieking grandstands? In the FRG, gastarbeiters are among the spectators. Who are the kibitzers in Poland? In most cases, they are vocational school pupils, who are asked to be mannerly, polite and not to use dirty language. Take care in identifying a sports arena with a nation. There is a great deal of male chauvinism in this. If women were asked what they thought of a spectacular sport, our entire world outlook in this regard would fall in ruins. In addition, some social groups regard sports only as amusement. It is nice when there are good results, but, when they are not there, they somehow manage to suffer through that with the help of prosperity. This stopgap of circumstances, wellbeing and stability in Poland managed, at this moment, to arouse such great animosities because there are limits to compensating activities, externally as well as internally. Sports are a compensation of a world without war, but to certain limits.

Maciej Wierzynski: Above all, sports have a compensating character. The greater the compensating character is, the more a community, a society, a nation needs sports as an "opium." To be sure, if authority needs something like that, it also has a compensating character.

What is the range of effective action of that opium? This can be investigated, using the example of reaction to great sports affairs, the coverage by various mass media; this opium functions, first of all, for use by one's own society. On the other hand, it has an extremely limited effectiveness on external, international use.

It is one of those myths supported by sports activists and sportswriters, that a sports score has such a stupendous impact, insofar as the propaganda of a given country on the international arena is concerned, and so on. That is not so.

What are the premises of an appraisal that sport as an instrument of international propaganda is a faulty instrument? The first premise--as in any field--is that there must be a possibility of an understanding with the recipient, of reaching him. Sport is universal only on the face of it. Even soccer is not that kind of sport; for example, it is a marginal sport in the United States.

Recently, a list of the 10 best athletes of the last 25 years was published in the United States. Borg's name headed the list. It was followed by the names of nine athletes whose names are now known to anyone in Europe. There were reports in European newspapers, as well as in Polish, that this was a misunderstanding. It was not so. Different sports are practiced in the United States; namely, baseball,

football, tennis and basketball. Even the name of a swimmer as popular as Spitz was not on that list.

If we wanted to convince the world with the help of sports how fine a nation we are, we would have to send sumo wrestlers to Japan, a baseball player to the United States, a skier to Switzerland and a toreador to Spain. That is not possible.

What happens in such a situation? When large international affairs take place, each country plays up to its own public through newspapers and television stations. Not only venal Polish journalists go to the Olympics and write exclusively about our representatives. The sportswriters of other countries are doing the same thing. During the Moscow Olympics I learned about such an unusual event as Komar's victory from a three-line note in THE INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, which has a large sports section. On the other hand, there was a great deal in that paper about how the American sprinter was delayed at the start of the race, something that was of little significance anyway, because Borzow was beyond the reach of the competition.

On such occasions, every country writes primarily about its participants and about those sports that are practiced and popular in its country. An awareness is created in this way, with respect to the uninformed part of the public, that the world lives on our triumphs.

Sports do not have as great a breakthrough power as believed insofar as international triumphs are concerned. I made an experiment when we were reveling in the Polish soccer team's triumph. It won thrid place in Munich. I asked friends who won third place in the preceding championships. No one knew. That country was Portugal. Perhaps you will recall the waves of mad, megalomaniac propaganda that ensured at the time. If we were to devote the same amount of effort to the Portuguese triumph, we would die laughing.

Ziemilski: During the Moscow, Olympics, I read NEUE ZURCHER ZEITUNG. On the front pages, the GDR was upbraided for being politically hardheaded, while on the sports pages it was praised for its results. This is a deviation from practice. For example, there were photographs that introduced GDR swimmers (female) as beautiful girls. Perhaps there is a mechanism operating here, helping the Swiss compensate for their own weaknesses?

Wierzynski: From my presentation it could seem that sports have absolutely no significance. Here is a deviation. The great champions--Comaneci, Borg and others--still arouse admiration in the entire world. But that is "individual" admiration, which is not registered to the national account. Are Comaneci's triumphs added to the account of Romania's triumphs as a country? I am not certain.

Dobroczynski: Those arguments convince me. Sports do not directly influence opinion-making groups.

Symonides: And they are not an instrument of foreign policy in the literal sense of the word.

Dobroczynski: Probably nothing concrete or tangible can be attained in external relations with the help of sports. However, there of course needs and means of

indirect action on foreign societies. This does not concern anything immediate but that the country be noticed and appreciated somewhere or, conversely, as the Republic of South Africa felt the condemnation of international opinion. Sports do not lead to concrete results. But this also pertains to other spheres. Let us compare sports with the arts. A substantially larger number of people in the world knew the names of Polish athletes than of artists.

Ryszka: But what people are they?

Symonides: In some situations the masses decide everything.

Dobroczynski: Is this question already so deeply and closely examined? Sports do not clear the road directly for policy; however, do they not in some sense create a favorable climate for becoming interested? It is important not only that something is resolved right away but, for example, that the country be noticed on the outside as frequently as possible and treated at least with a modicum of recognition. If a country is powerful and developed, it has other trump cards, and the question discussed here may not have greater significance. On the other hand, if one does not have other arguments, why should sports at times not be a useful opening tool?

Skinder: Sports with triumphs that are of significance in the world, like attainments in the field of culture or science, create that friendly climate facilitating talks on international subjects by politicians and statesmen. Otherwise, the composing triumphs of Penderecki, the popularity of our distinguished conductors--Krenza, Korda, Wislocki, Rowicki, Maksymiuk--the appearances on the world's leading opera stages of Zylis-Gara, Szostek-Radkowa, Donat and Ochman are without significance, as are Grotowski's theatrical spectacles, the concerts of the Grand Symphony Orchestra of Polish Radio, the Mazowsze, or Wajda and Zanussi films. In other words, only the negotiations of politicians and diplomats would influence the course of events.

To be sure, there are countries in which sports are not regarded very highly, in which the triumph of an outstanding Polish athlete is acknowledged by a two-line notation in the press. Sports have become a phenomenon of the 20th centruy and they evoke an enormous amount of interest. More than one billion people in the world watch the television transmissions of the Olympic games. Can a triumph achieved before such an enormous audience pass without any echo? I do not diminish this phenomenon, and I do not intend to magnify it. Everything needs to be seen in proper proportions. A sport can create--and in our case, it does create--a climate that clears the way for politicians. Otherwise, the foreign affairs minister of the Polish People's Republic would not be honoring outstanding people from the world of sports each year. Laureates were Szewinska, Rutkiewicz, Chojnowska-Liskiewicz, Teliga, Szurkowski, Kozakiewicz, volleyball players as world and Olympic games champions, etc. Do their names mean something only in Poland, or are they known and appreciated worldwide? Irena Szewinska is an award laureate of the French Academy of Sports; she was presented the award by the French Republic's President Valery Giscard d'Estaing. Is this without significance in international relations?

You have reflected, gentlemen, whether a sports triumph can have an influence on raising international prestige. It can. Of course, you can look at Wladyslaw Kozakiewicz's gold medal--one of the greatest and most worthwhile victories during the summer games of the 22nd Olympics in Moscow, linked with setting a world record--as his personal triumph. His triumph, and his trainer's--a physical education

teacher who taught him has sporting ABCs --is the triumph of a Polish athlete, not necessarily of Poland itself. Poland's position and recognition in the world do not depend directly on such attainments. But I would not belittle this type of event. The triumphs of Kozakiewicz create the favorable climate around Polish questions in the international arena. The level of sports in a country reflects the overall cultural level of a given country, in the eyes of other nations.

From another viewpoint, young liberated countries, proud of gaining independence, wish to confirm their identity as rapidly as possible. They are aware of the fact that they can do this easily and quickly through sports. Thus, in the past quarter century we have witnessed an ever more lively participation by developing countries, particularly African, South American and Asian, in international sports competition and above all in the Olympic games, which constitute the best opportunity for demonstrating achievement in the widest possible forum. Beginning with the summer Olympic games in Tokyo in 1964, we are witnessing the massive participation of developing states in the Olympics--on the order of 60 percent and more of total participation in athletic contests--and also dazzling triumphs--for example, the long-distance runners of Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania, etc. Sports there grow to the status of a state symbol, and the dependence of sports on politics is particularly large. Frankly, in the present state of relations between people, sports are not and probably cannot be a neutral phenomenon. Sports cannot be separated from the struggle for progress and social rights.

Can sports constitute a weapon in the hands of politicians, and is this weapon effective? I do not intend to exaggerate the events preceding the Olympic games in Moscow, but we ought to look at them closely. President Carter, Mrs. Thatcher, the West German government and other allies of the United States, acting on an assumption that was not aimed at the international Olympic movement, but against the Soviet Union, utilized a boycott of the greatest and noblest sports spectacle as a means of attaining a specific political goal. Although the success of this undertaking was only partial, although it met with a protest by many activists in those countries, particularly a protest by embittered athletes who were brutally deprived of an opportunity to display their skills at the games, this was indubitably an example of utilizing sports as a weapon in the hands of politicians.

Ziemilski: Was this more significant internally? Carter boycotted the Olympics because this was painful internally for the Soviet Union and not for the Olympic movement as a whole worldwide. He wanted to "punish" the Soviet Union.

Skinder: It did not have internal significance. Only a blockade of various types of export deliveries associated with organizing the Olympics to 3 August, that is, to the end of the games, could be treated in that way. Washington's call to boycott the games in Moscow threatened the entire international Olympic movement with collapse. During the 83rd session of the International Olympic Committee (MKOl) at Lake Placid in February 1980, after an unprecedented political, aggressive presentation by U.S. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance--a precedent in the history of the committee's deliberations--Lord Killanin, the helmsman of the international Olympic movement, delivered a dramatic appeal not to use the Olympic games to divide the world but to unite it and not to use the athletes for resolving political problems. In consequence of government decisions of a political, economic or administrative nature, representatives of many countries were missing from the games in the Moscow arenas, but the idea of the Olympiad was saved. There was the threat that the games would no longer be able to take place.

The Olympiads have been a convenient platform for a long time for all kinds of political demonstrations. The history of the modern games at the turn of the 19th century notes symptoms of German-French and Anglo-American conflicts. In 1936, efforts were made in Berlin to use the Olympiad for proving the superiority of the German race and for proclaiming fascist ideology. In 1956, in Melbourne, tendencies were manifested to capitalize on the Suez conflict. The bloody massacre on the Place of Three Cultures just before the 1968 games in Mexico; during those games, the silent protest of the U.S. black athletes against racial discrimination in their country; the act of terror and force against the Israeli athletes in Munich four years later; the unprecedented boycott of the 21st Olympic games in 1976 in Montreal by 27 African countries, with slogans calling for war against racism and discrimination; and finally, the boycott of the 1980 summer Olympics initiated by President Carter--these are the successive manifestations of that tendency.

The Olympic games, which until yesterday were an athletic affair with certain political consequences, have changed their character. They are being used ever more frequently for immediate political purposes.

Wierzynski: Insofar as African countries are concerned, sports are treated as an instrument of national identification. Young nations need a binding agent and heroes.

However, if this is a problem associated with culture, the mechanism is extremely similar. The various triumphs with which we intoxicate ourselves, even if they be the film triumphs of recent years, when Polish films won awards at all film festivals--these are a joy that is principally ours. Polish films hardly exist in worldwide commercial cinematography. Even the Nobel prize for Milosz, in the main, was our holiday. Let us remind ourselves of the kind of response here for the Nobel prize for Quasimodo or for that Greek poet whose name I do not remember. I do not belittle those triumphs; I only want us not to live by illusions.

Symonides: In our discussion we seem to govern ourselves by the assumption that a defined mythology exists around sports. So many opinions and exaggereated ideas have arisen, that we ought to debunk their role and significance. It is difficult not to agree with the view that sports have a compensating character, with all the pluses and minuses of that phenomenon. If a country has no other possibility of finding itself in [press] agency news headlines, then sports create such an opportunity.

Perhaps we also justly called attention to the fact that sometimes sports can lead to the development of nationalism. Situations in which one's own sportsman is mentioned without regard to the position that he held, while the top three who won medals are not mentioned, or when evident defeats are interpreted in various ways, do not teach objectivity but are examples of extending the methods of manipulation and propaganda to sports.

Do sports create culture in the broad meaning of that word? Sometimes they do. The rather select audience at a tennis match that demands greater expertness behaves differently than an audience viewing a discipline that does not require training. The viewers of elite matches behave differently from mass sports viewers. Sometimes sports lead to highly reprehensible behavior, to the primitive discharge of emotions.

It should not be forgotten, however, that, above all, sports are amusement. They are an amusement with the greatest audience--often many millions--simultaneously following the sports events in front of television sets or radio receivers.

If it is such massive amusement, then certain consequences are associated with it. A sports triumph is a fleeting thing, but at a given moment it reaches millions. When I was in South America in 1974 during the world soccer championships in Munich, what I heard on the streets and on the radio and what I read in the newspapers in Poland--and the names of the Polish soccer players. Along with this, there was talk not only about soccer; to some extent all sorts of information about Poland were published. I do not want to exaggerate this, but for some time, perhaps a half-year or several months, our sports triumph paved the way for an interest in our country.

What I want to call attention to is the promotion possibility, so to speak, of the sports function. This pertains particularly to specific fields of sports identified with the use of specific equipment: car racing, gliding, cycling, etc.

Very frequently in international relations, we have to deal with negative stereotypes. A particular nation is considered to be incapable, not very industrious, disorganized, etc. In certain situations, athletic attainments can lead to breaking negative opinions. If it is thought that Poles on a given team cannot accomplish anything and a soccer or volleyball team plays well, this can lead to some extent to a refutation of that stereotype. Sports do not have to teach love but in certain instances can verify judgments and teach respect and objectivism.

Ryszka: We ought to distinguish clearly between elitist culture and mass culture, with this caveat, that elitist culture people can take an interest in mass culture. The reverse is rarely true. Elitist culture can step down while mass culture rarely rises.

It is necessary to differentiate between foreign policy as the conscious activity of a state and the universal conception of another state. We all transmit ideas on a state about which we know something. With the aid of appropriate arguments, we also want to overthrow ideas existing in another state. As a historian of the most recent times, I know of no instance where this had a positive influence. On the other hand I know of instances where it had a negative influence.

The 1936 Olympiad in Berlin was one of the best organized Olympiads. There was no boycott, no disturbance. Seemingly, there was an atmosphere of brotherhood and understanding: black, yellow, "non-Aryan"--all found a place. The organizers acquired the greatest number of medals--I think it was 2/3--that is, they acquired 33 medals, because there was substantially less competition. What was the outcome of that? The incredible masquerade was supposed to conceal the illegalities behind the facade of that athletic holiday. A French team marched in front of the grandstands with their hands raised in a Hitlerite greeting, something thoroughly registered on film.

Mass culture is based on idols. Frequently, irrational segments prevail. An idol, who is an ordinary scoundrel, is loved. This can be a film star (female)--a drug addict or an alcoholic. It can be someone like Muhammad Ali, who serves various gods, principally mammon. It can be a mercenary machine, like Borg, or it can also be a much more authentic figure like Niki Lauda. The personalities of stars vary.

Thus, it differs from an elite culture, where primarily a product is purchased. The act of creativity is more important than the subject of activity.

Dobroczynski: Perhaps the subject also is important.

Ryszka: That is not so important. Actions are more important than people. However, more frequently national problems and national or group affiliations are included, even if artificial, as in the case of Muhammad Ali. In sports, as a component of mass culture, people are also defined by symbols worn on shirts, although frequently these are advertisements of products that have nothing in common with sports--for example, the advertisement of Gitanes cigarettes in the Tour de France.

An identification that flows from a symbol does not necessarily add any importance to a nation. A nation that attains great triumphs in record-seeking sports can be treated as a nation of acrobats, and not a nation in which confidence is placed because it is politically responsible. The criterion is real, which does not mean that we should agree with a stereotyped division of nations into important and unimportant. The dimensions of the nation, its actual superiorities and power status do not remain in dependence or in symmetrical relation with that opinion.

What convinced me? It was the dualism of opinions, that at times something is treated worse as the product of an elitist culture. This is clear with films. It is almost a rule in films that those films that won awards, are boycotted by the public, while the films that make money, as a rule, win no awards. I know of no instance of a film attaining great fame worldwide and receiving an award at any festival. Instead, films that no one goes to see receive awards.

What is the situation with respect to sports? What is the source of rivalry started at a very high elitist level? Obviously, it is a triumph defined by the measure of the achievement, for which its originators must pay dearly by merciless training from early childhood. A matter that is coming back, and which now is particularly fashionable, is the rivalry of both sexes. I read somewhere that Johnny Weissmuller--later famous for his role as Tarzan--today would not win a place in a ladies' 100-meter freestyle race. What is the result of this? Should women necessarily be encouraged to attain such results? I do not know how to reply, although I am afraid that sports attainments can blatantly swerve from aesthetic principles at a given moment, and then record-seeking sports turn against the conventional notions of femininity. This is how men see it, but it would be better if women expressed their opinion.

Ziemilski: I will propose a certain list for consideration: Fibak, Penderecki, Wajda, John Paul II, Kozakiewicz, Milosz. After September, I would add Walesa. This is a list of persons whose names frequently appear in the columns of foreign newspapers and who create a characteristic "image" of our country.

At one time consideration was given in German sociology as to the basis for the feeling of, for example, Poland or Germany "winning" a match. Why can it be said that we won? Why do we identify ourselves? According to the opinions that emerged, what is involved is identification not only with the success itself but also with the process of the selection and training of the elite. Every society creates elites, thanks to which it can survive: leaders, professionals, creative groups. When a

Polish team wins a match, we half-consciously feel that the mechanism of creating the elite in our country (production, selection, training) functions well. We can be proud of our nation because it was capable of forming such elites.

If we look at the list, then I would partially agree. Actually I would be ready to see proof in Fibak that a Polish athletic family functions well. Insofar as the pope is concerned, he fulfills all values esteemed in our national life. He confirms them by his way of life, views, likings and even his origin. All of this is splendid. The same would in some measure pertain to Kozakiewicz (Polish athletic school), Milosz (a great body of national poetry values, its independence), and so on.

However, does not our inability to create other elites, leaders and managers, simultaneously have an influence on our "image?" the inability of leaders to select groups of dependable people? our inability for good management on a macro- and microscale?

The entire personality context existing in a given epoch contributes to the "image" of a nation in the opinion of outsiders. Sports contribute a kind of note, opportunities and possibilities to that. If, however, a series of other elements disputes this, if it turns out that we do not know how to shape all of the important elite in social life in an equal manner, then the role of sports diminishes.

Our aspirations are culturally justified. Society justifies them. Astigmatism in organizing the economy spoils the image. A nation's varied abilities to utilize various prospects contribute to its image. The problem pertains not to talents but to the possibilities of their development, skill in their utilization and incorporation into nationwide functions.

We know how to incorporate nationwide culture and art into functions, despite the difficulties that we have. We also know sport. There are many other fields that we cannot manage. It would be worthwhile someday to investigate how this "image" balances abroad with respect to those prospects, abilities and their realization.

Ryszka: That "image" is created by transmission. We live in a world of increased, faster and better news.

Here is an example from a few years ago when the propaganda of triumph was beginning. A color film about Poland was made. There were pictures from a helicopter: monuments, the Warsaw Castle, Tatra Mountains, the sea and smoking chimneys During a Polish national holiday in July, I found myself in Paris, French television showed a film about Poland. In general, the tone was sympathetic. But what did it show, what "image"--in the literal sense of the word? A streetcar with "grapes" is moving, there are queues--smaller ones than now, however--in front of stores, lopsided homes in the capital, people in average or worse than average clothes, the kind of morning crowd that spills from the downtown railroad station. And this is Warsaw "in French." To be sure, the commentator said some smooth phrase about a heroic and splendid people. As for me, I flared up in anger because it sounded like irony. Then I thought, yes, that is how it looks on weekdays, not from a helicopter that selectively chooses images for the camera. And here came an ordinarily spiteful reporter with a camera, who photographed what he saw on the ground. It is no matter; such an image is more likely to win over a forewarned receiver.

Does the addition of stars to this image change anything? Perhaps it does in certain opinion-making circles. But it does not change the basic image. The country looks just as it is shown on television.

Dobroczynski: In general, broad opinion is not shaped on comprehensive discernment but on its elements. What does a model of the GDR mean for the many? As a rule, it means not hard work, and not alienated neighbors who do not know how to establish contact with similarly alienated neighbors. On the other hand, it means several selected, spectacular elements such as market supply and excellent organization. Those are selected elements, not the totality. Frequently, the outside world makes the greatest impression on those segments in which one himself is weak. In turn, many people in Western societies are fascinated with the fantasy of a life whose accessibility is so difficult for them. They are not impressed because someone else also has an automobile. In short, they are seeking some kind of compensation. Can sport be a specific form of compensation not only internally--to cover one's own weaknesses--but externally--to pit oneself effectively against those who demonstrate superiority in so many segments? Who can be impressed in this way? The first indication that one is equal frequently is of a fragmentary character. How is it that a nation generally considered as backward, has substantial attainments in soccer or other sports? Does this lead to the conclusion that, if a given society were organized as well in other segments as in sports, it would attain equally as much as highly developed nations?

Ziemilski: In other words, do you treat sport as information about potential? That potential is very specialized.

Dobroczynski: I am constantly concerned about the first signal, about the fact that suddenly these marginal people feel the equal of Englishmen in a given segment and that they are noticed by the world.

Wierzynski: Bikila Abebe started running while Haile Selassie was emperor.

Ziemilski: But what does "becoming noticed" mean? A long time ago, I collected postage stamps. I noticed the French Ivory Coast colony because I had stamps with a picture of an elephant. That is the experience of many people. An entire ideology of philately existed. I would like to see the difference here between sport and philately.

Dobroczynski: Sports are an attempt to compare national qualities. A true athlete of Kenya is compared with an athlete of Great Britain. In postcolonial philately, stamps designed by Europeans and printed in Europe dominate. That is the difference.

No group in any field appears officially as the representative of the nation as a whole, not in science, culture or technology. On the other hand, a soccer match advertises itself as a meeting of Poland versus Italy. That means a Poland as a state and as a community against an Italy of the same type. However, in actuality, 11 Polish boys play against 11 Italian boys. And I have not been aware of any protests to date that this is not Poland but 11 men whom some association selected. Broad identification with the nation and the state takes place on both sides.

Ryszka: This is a contribution to the history of symbols. That is how states and state cultures developed.

Dobroczynski: Exactly why does it develop in sports?

Ryszka: Sports were convenient for that purpose. Sports inherited it from the history of tournaments.

Ziemilski: Let us recall Stanislaw Mariusz's jump from Montelupich prison in Krakow in 1940 and think of the strange connections between a (ski) jump at Krokwia, gliding for abstract purposes, and the jump to save life, a battle jump. This type of symbol is easier where physical activity comes into play. Sports have that tough biologism, the authenticity of existence. But it is equally easy to overinterpret this.

Wierzynski: Do sports bring nations together? I have a hypothesis to propose: At the international level, sports depend on various circumstances, or simply on political manipulations. On the other hand, on a personal or interpersonal level, sports create opportunities for close relations. In short, we meet our colleagues and we strike up friendships.

Ziemilski: This fits the thesis that if a shoemaker from New Zealand meets a shoemaker from Guatemala, there is a common subject pertaining to shoemaking. Despite everything, sports are something a bit higher than this.

Wierzynski: I agree.

Ziemilski: This would create the impression that sports are a kind of community of quasi-professionals, and sometimes entirely professional interests. However, it is a little more.

Wierzynski: Let us return to the role of sports as a specific instrument of international relations. The boycott of the last Olympiad by the United States did not attain the intended goal, which was lowering the status of the games primarily in the eyes of the Soviet society and to affect Soviet pride. The absence of a series of serious contenders could simply strengthen that society's feeling that "we really are strong" and that the Americans did not come because they were afraid of defeat.

Ziemilski: However, it was not so. The absence of the Americans weighed heavily, it touched the entire Soviet society. I was there, I had contacts with various friends in Moscow. It is not true that the boycott did not affect them, or that the absences in the march past (the grandstands) was unnoticed. This gesture did touch them.

On the other hand, it was an inconsequential gesture because many Western countries were represented and also because, in some measurable sports, as being important as never before. In the end, the Americans did not forbid American tourist travel to the Soviet Union. The government did not exercise pressure on scientists or authors--just sports.

Ryszka: We need to consider when the problem of state identification first existed in sports. The institution of traditional, national and folkloristic symbols is a new thing. The Polish national anthem was introduced between the world wars; previously there was no occasion for it. But other national hymns were also introduced

rather belatedly. There is, of course, a parallel "channel," when people of various nations meet, when no one identified himself with a nation but only with himself, that is, his group. This "channel" is older. The history of the organization of sports fascinates me. Which came first, the sport club or national representation? And which is more important?

Ziemilski: In England, probably the club came first.

Ryszka: England is the fatherland of sports, and sports had social roots. Rugby is a simple game, soccer is more complicated. But actually rugby was first adopted as a game by an elegant group of sportsmen. Soccer arose in labor centers in Germany, Poland, Belgium, Spain, Austria, Hungary and Czechoslovakia.

Every identification has significance. If there is a national identity, politics has already made an appearance. If you dress soccer players in shirts and play the national anthem, then naturally the public sees a rivalry between nations in the match. Everyone says without thinking that "we gave the Germans a thrashing" or "that was a Polish-English battle at Wembley," etc.

Dobroczynski: At one time pedagogues said that it is better if people fight in the ring than with knives. Should sports in this sense also be considered as a form of compensation?

Ziemilski: After the famous match at Wembley, I read a commentary in a West German publication that consisted of one sentence: "What did not succeed for the Great Armada or Napoleon, and tripped Hitler, was accomplished by a certain Domarski emerging and submerging again in a sea of forgetfulness." We are inclined to overstretch English katzenjammer, which supposedly encompassed only certain spheres. I do not know if all Englishmen knew that there was something like that at all.

Dobroxzynski: In an international sense, it is not just matches, it is also the so-called demonstration effect. In less-developed countries one accepts certain cultural forms of more highly developed countries, and perhaps vice versa. More than one sport, for example, badminton or turf hockey, was taken over from less developed countries by more developed ones. Thus, sports can be some kind of a factor leading toward equalization, a life style, a way of self-glorification, organization, form of action, adaptation. People in highly and weakly developed countries, more or less equally, want to get organized and trained and to observe the rules of the game in order to attain comparable results. It may be that these traits are subsequently carried--subconsciously--from the sphere of sports to other fields. Has that been studied? Can anything be said on this subject?

Ryszka: Today's record-seeking sports demand heaps of money, and only record-seeking sports can create models.

Dobroczynski: I am concerned with the second stage, the long-range cultural consequences.

Ryszka: People have to see that at the stadium. Very poor countries like India can afford a good turf hockey team. The team will beat others and eventually be beaten. Will people viewing this in stadiums be able to emulate the team? Will they

themselves play, or will they behave as if they practiced sports? They will do neither the one nor the other. Receipt does not evoke repercussions. I repeat: There are no dependencies.

Dobroczynski: It is not the moment that is concerned. What is concerned are changes observed in life style, aspirations, discipline and society's interests.

Ziemilski: Look at student discotheques, see what they are like in America and in Poland. Some types of activity are identical, taken over, remodeled. The discotheque is an excellent example. If you examine the type of action, relationship to improvement, attitudes toward work, it must be acknowledged that sports do not have a great influence.

Dobroczynski: But do they have any kind?

Ziemilski: Yes. Sports have the kind that assures that a soccer player who is trained in the Polish soccer school and goes abroad has identical technical elements as others. However, the way he works, acts, improves himself and his attitude will be different.

Dobroczynski: Many of the consequences of international sports contacts still remain an area of unfinished studies. Many extreme opinions are still held, not only exaggerated ones but also those rejecting the positive consequences of the development of this sphere of international relations. I would side with those who see substantially more social benefits than losses resulting from international competition in the field of sports; however, the matter certainly demands comprehensive studies and cannot be adequately explained via impressions.

I have several observations on the political aspects of this issue. No one negates that sports--in the intrastate as well as interstate dimension--remain the domain of policy, whether one likes it or not. A policy is conducted in various forms and with varied intensity, aimed at various goals--but it is policy. It is sometimes aimed at raising spirits to compensate for one's own weaknesses and at times aimed at an overall increase in the country's prestige in the international arena. And in some instances, it is interested in very clear, concrete results. For example it can be aimed at compromising and isolating political adversaries from the international community (the policy of many world states against South Africa or Chile, the position of the United States toward the Moscow Olympics, etc.) or attaining integration goals, such as those of close relations with African or Asian countries through regularly organized continental games, bringing allied armies closer together through organizing periodic championships, etc. Sports can also constitute an instrument for breaking up various systems and types of barriers between countries, if only to mention here the noisy ping-pong diplomacy, as well as the Balkan games, and other events of this type. Finally, if sports facilitate society's integration, that phenomenon also, of course, has international dimensions and international significance, which surely influences the balance of power in a modest way. Sports under a national flag prevent cosmopolitanism better than they favor nationalism. Perhaps this is a pertinent thought, although it too must be subjected to verification in time as well as space, just as the other effects of an international sports relations policy.

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MARXIST PHILOSOPHY IN THE MODERN WORLD

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[Article by Radu Florian]

[Text] We do not feel that a philosophical and social-political work exists in the history of culture whose imprint has marked a century of history with such vigor as Marx' works have done in our century. The main transforming processes which irreversibly changed the direction of man's history and the political map of the world were and are linked with Marx' works. Also they were and continue to be in the center of the most important and significant theoretical confrontations of the age, rousing more than a few various, often divergent interpretations accompanied by big bitter disputes as well as true streams of hope and innovative searches as well as furious and fanatic adversities.

A future historical goal of the spirituality of this time, the watershed between two directions of social development, cannot help but find that the overall ideas and values worked out by Marx and Engels, implicitly or explicitly, have been the reference system for the most impassioned ideological conflicts of the century, while, in a mediating way, the source of the varied ramification of non-Marxist currents.

For that reason one may state that the decisive influence of Marx' works on this age, sometimes plain and sometimes less visible, but no less constant, is one of the "keys" to deciphering the history of our age, in which man has seen heights but abysses which were hard to imagine before.

That is why to understand our own time, with its contradictory happenings, means, among other things, to know the entire diversity and wealth of ideas of Marx' thought.

The assertion may seem to some people forced and presumptive, since an idea being broadly spread today and maintained by many adherents of bourgeois ideology claims that we no longer can find out anything new about Marx' thought and that all its secrets are more than well known. This viewpoint feels that Marxism, having been a process of the 19th century, no longer has anything or almost anything new to tell us, those who are going through another period of history with many specific problems, to which Marx could not have found an answer.

Two primary facts are forgotten in making this assertion: the first, that the most important scientific discovery of Marx, which made possible all the other ones, is his philosophy. Although worked out in its basic outlines in the 19th century, it

uncovers, through the overall determinations of social existence, the methods for scientific knowledge of the various stages of human history, from the past as well as from the present. Other facts were added to the ones known in the last century and they, however, have confirmed all the theoretical grids formulated by Marx and its nature as an objective truth, a permanent tool for knowledge. It should be noted that the accumulations from various branches of science, including the true information explosion of the last four decades, did not question the of Marxist explanation but merely brought out the need to increase its degree of suitability.

A second basic fact, not taken into consideration from the viewpoint mentioned, is that despite the many changes which occurred in the presentation of history in the 20th century compared with that of the previous age, the determining features of the capitalist system and its social reproduction have remained unchanged in its broad lines or, using a current term,have demonstrated unchanging. For that reason, aspects of the need to replace capitalism with a new society, the socialist one, as well as some of its notes uncovered by the creators of Marxism retain their complete viability today, also. A relevant proof in the regard mentioned is basically the varied phenonena of crisis, from economic to spiritual, in modern capitalism--which not even its apologists can deny any longer--as well as the political trends and movements aimed to changing the world in the direction of socialism.

Another element, most times overlooked, must be added to this and that is the degree of communicability of a philosophical and social-political work with a historical era depends on the thoroughness of its knowledge, of the discovery of its many aspects. Without any exaggeration, in my opinion, one may see that a long road still has to be travelled until the full scientific exegesis of Marx' work.

Many cases, which we mention merely in passing, have contributed to the creation of this situation: the late publication, in our century, of some of Marx' primary works, such as "Economic-Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844," "German Ideology," written in collaboration with Engels, "The Bases for Criticism of Political Economics,"without which his works could not have been studied in their totality and for that reason some of his ideas could not be discovered in their original grid, even in the last decades of the last century, establishment of a positivist and economistic interpretation of Marxism as a result of failing to understand the specific original nature of the thought worked out by Marx and Engels, a fact which placed its imprint up until today, being admitted as the only authentic one; the domination of dogmatism for a period of time during the 20th century, which underestimated the importance of a scientific, critical study of the ideas of Marxism on the basis of Marx' and Engels' original works, in exchange, frequently being a vehicle for theses lacking coverage in their texts. An analysis of Marx' and Engels' works involves utilization of scientific-critical methods intended to discover the diversity of formulations of an idea and to compare them plus disengaging the permanent components from the accidnetal, circumstantial ones.

It is an illusion that a simple reading of a Marx text permits a critical identification of his ideas and their originality and significance in the field of philosophy or social-political thought.

Reciting a work by Marx in the spirit of scientific-critical methods leads not only to broadening the area of communication with it, that is, to uncovering a contemporary Marx of a much greater wealth and depth than that accredited two decades ago, as well as an understanding of its historic destiny, a cardinal problem for the life of many generations in this century, which is nearing its end.

The discovery of initial and original Marx works and the return to the source of Marxist thought are an obligatory condition for understanding the real features of the various political currents formed in its field and facilitate a study of their path, elements for theoretical development and practical opening as well as the way in which simplistic and ecclectic interpretations joined with practices which were either wrong or even deforming.

This direction of research is all the more necessary since an extremist viewpoint--that of the so-called "new philosophers" but also shared by many others--attributes to Marx the theoretical responsibility for the breakdowns in operation, deformations of all kinds recorded in the transition process to the new system, since it did not interpret any eventualities and risks of the dialectics of this process and the means for avoiding them. Through a subtle ideological manipulation, ,it is sought to bring on what at another time I would call the "guilt complex" of all those whom the thought of Marx filled with the socialist ideal and guided their political action.

The subject, in the forefront of many current analyses and controversies regarding Marxism, is too broad to discuss here in all its scope. We shall illustrate just several ideas which I propose to bring out some of the less known aspects from Marx' works but, at the same time, ones which are deeply significant in their contemporary nature.

At a time like right now, when efforts are being made in Europe to bring back into circulation some "philosophies of existence" as the nucleus for a new existentialist metaphysics, a special mention should be made of the fact that Marx is the creator of a highly original ontology replaced basically by a metaphysical and scholastic materialist vision of the existence of reality.

Concisely, the idea of Marxist ontology consists of conceiving of existence in general, man's existence in particular in terms of the special features of relations between men and not as a metaphysical artithesis of matter and spirit. Thus, Marx early arrives at defining the human existence by "praxis" and, within the framework of its form, by practice in particular, that is, by its permanent self-production at all levels of manifestation. This particular feature becomes intelligible only included in and in proportion to the objective existence in its totality. If such an existence would not exist, it would not be possible to create an objective human reality, either, indisputably proven by the historical evolution of the human species or the independent manifestation of man's spiritual state.

These ideas initially expressed even in the "Economic-Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844" have only been capitalized on only partially as landmarks of Marxist ontology (philosophy). Three of them, through their openings and resonance, deserve to be recalled in this framework.

A first statement establishes that "man is a generic being and not only because both theoretically as well as in practice he makes race--both his own as well as that of other things--one of his goals as well as because he behaves before himself as a person of the current, living race, a person of universal being, thus free." The characterization of man as a generic being (existence), implicit in the above lines, is explicitly explained in the following. "The practical creation of a world of objects and the processing of nonorganic nature are the self-assertion of man as a conscious generic being, in other words, a being who sees in race his own being or who sees a generic being in himself. For that reason, precisely by processing

the world of objects, man asserts himself for the first time as a generic being. Due to this production, nature appears like a work of his and a reality of his." Thus, man is a generic being, since by processing nature and its objects, he creates an objective reality of great differentiation--which exists as race--and because he sees in his own existence as a race his essence, from where the result is also the overwhelming dimension of his spiritual creation, forms for manifestation of subjectivity and the works it gives birth to.

The third statement from this same work, completing Marx' concept of existence, states that "the nature which develops within the framework of human history--this origin of human society--is the real nature of man."[1] These statements represent the true rupture between Marxist ontology and the previous or later ones, the non-Marxist ones, which should be the beginning for presenting his authentic form. They mark the substantiation of ontology on foundations of scientific knowledge, outlining a direction of great euristic productivity, still not developed today, in the diversity of multiple aspects which it contains.

This direction, thus, is clearly different from the one of the philosophers of existence who, by restricting existence (being) to that of man alone and only to his exclusively spiritual hyposthasis, cultivate a subjectivist and reclusive orientation, inherently arbitrary and transcendental, but not lacking in a clear ideological transparency, at least in some of his representatives.

Also, the rationalist and scientific articulation itself of Marxist ontology is the one which causes dissatisfaction and reticence among those who do not feel that knowledge is the single grounds for revealing the ontological and his determinations.

Another characteristic direction for the modern controversy about Marx' works refers to his contribution in defining the values of democracy in general and the socialist values in particular. In this regard one must observe the insufficient knowledge of and capitalization on Marx' role as a theoretician of democracy, both with regard to an analysis of aspects of exercising popular sovereignty and the mechanisms of working out political decision by the action of social collectives as well as with regard to the attention given to the individual as the central value of democracy and his creative assertion.

So, in one of the works of his youth, "Contributions to a Criticism of the Hegelian Philosophy of Law," in which he produces a break with Hegel's political thought, without any ambiguity Marx shows his choice for democracy, his method for conceiving of it as an expression of popular self-determination: "In democracy the state system itself appears merely as one of the determinations, that is, the people's self-determination. Democracy is the resolved enigma of all forms of the state system. Here the state system is continually reduced to its real basic nature, to real man, to real people and asserts itself as his own work."[2]

Marx' option for democracy is based on considering it as a work of the people themselves, in direct and indirect forms as an antithesis to the bureaucratic state, whose methods of exercising power, defended by Hegel, subject them to sharp criticism.

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1. K. Marx, F. Engels, "Writings From Youth," Political Publishing House, 1968, pp 554, 556, 582.

2. K. Marx, F. Engels, "Works," Volume 1, Political Publishing House, 1960, II Edition, p 256.

Bureaucracy represents "the state's awareness of itself," "will of the state," "power of the state" as a corporation. The state must be a corporation and,as a result, an exclusive, separate society, in the state. Even for a non-specialist in an analysis of Marx' texts, the formulation is required through a criticism of the idea of the state as the power resulting from the society and over it. It illuminates the fact that the bureaucratic state is one of divine authority exercised in a corporative spirit. "The spirit of the state, if it is known by everyone, as well as the state feeling appear to bureaucracy as a treason of its mystery. As a result, authority is the principle of science and divine authority is the sentiment of it," which is expressed in the fact that "general matters are carried out without being real matters of the people. The people's real matters are carried out without the people's intervention."[1]

These ideas would be taken and developed by Marx during an analysis devoted to the first historical form of a socialist state in the world, the Paris Commune. Marx conceives of the socialist state as a "true self-governing," as an organism in which exercising of the central jobs of the political leadership cannot lead to the placing of its followers over society so that they continually are subject to effective checking. Public jobs would cease to be private property any longer, conferred by the central government on its people."[2]

With regard to Marx' emphasizing the individual's role as the central value of democracy, it is enough to recall just several of his theses. Even in the "Economic-Philosophical Manuscrip s of 1844" Marx rejects as unfounded the opposing of society to the individual, a viewpoint which may lead to the cult of society's political institutions in relationship to the individual's rights and freedoms. The idea is all the more precious since even this work formulates the thesis of the social determination of the individual, which brings out that the two levels cannot be confused, that the social determinism in which the individual is included cannot be an argument for minimizing him , for underestimating his area of manifestation. By guessing some of the dangers which could appear in planning this component of social relations, Marx called it rudimentary that a future society which denied man's personality would exist. Continuing, the text states: "Rudimentary communism is just accomplishment of this leveling trend, proceeding from an imagined minimum. As little as this eradication of private property is, a true approach proves to us precisely the abstract denial of the entire world of culture and civilization and the return to the unnatural simplicity of the poor man lacking needs, who not only has not overcome private property but has not even arrived there yet."[3]

The idea is not in the least accidental. It returns in one of Marx' and Engels' books of 1873 which, commenting on some anarchist texts which outline a social organization which regulates on the basis of military discipline up to the smallest detail, the behavior of individuals without taking into account the need for their free development, categorically observed: "An admirable example of barracks communism!"[4]

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1. Ibidem, pp 274, 275, 292.

2. K. Marx, F. Engels, "Works," Volume 17, Political Publishers, 1963, p 627.

3. K. Marx, F. Engels, "Writing From Youth," p 574.

4. K. Marx, F. Engels, "Works," Volume 18, Political Publishers, 1964, p 425.

The fact that Marx and Engels wrote in "Manifesto of the Communist Party" the thesis that socialist society must represent "an association within whose framework the free development of each person is a condition for the free development of everyone"* shows once again the attention they gave to achieving this aspect of the future of society.

Another direction in Marx' works which is of profound modern interest is the one which brings out that aspect of building the socialist society is in accomplishing the leap from social and in ividual alienation to disalienation. The process is guessed at in many of their own elements, from having society take over its dialectics in achieving a democratic planning of social relations and choices for their operation to the change in appearance of activity and training of society's members with a view to their participation in all the processes of society's leadership up to the leap of the people's transformation with the goal of social operation and development, of their involvement in exclusively and directly creative activity. The development of socialist society in Marx is indissolubly linked with the progress of disalienation, while this is not an automatic phenomenon but means cultivating and making objective the values of total humanization of social relations.

All this shows that Marx' works not only cannot be considered in any way responsible for the accidents which have occurred in the historical process of creating the new system but, on the contrary, one may find the conclusion--even without going further with the analysis--that they to some extent are due to failing to understand and to carry out some of the landmark ideas in Marx' works.

This conclusion appears as a central argument in the need for the current recital of Marx' works and of a scientific and critical reading which, without making them absolute in any way, without making them sacred, should lead to a fertile enrichment of their dialogue with modern spirtuality. Of course, the transition from a philosophical or social-political idea to practice is not a simple process, since a philosophical idea is not of a normative nature and does not necessarily indicate the mediated links in the technique for carrying it out. A specialized investigation is needed for each package of ideas with a view to working out techniques for action intended to provide adequate implementation of them.

Of course, a reading of Marx' works does not in any way mean falling into another extreme idea as if it would cover the ready answers to the diversity of questions and problems of our time, which, even as an hypothesis, is a theoretical and political impossibility. For that reason, a reciting of Marx' works in order to be productive must be combined with research, in the spirit of it, into the problems of our century, a working out of solutions which correspond to the demands of the current stage of development of society and the complex modern social problems so that , in turn, they mark a new page in the history of human knowledge.

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* K. Marx, F. Engels, "Works," Volume 4, Political Publishers, 1958, p 488.

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SIGNIFICANT NEW CONTRIBUTIONS OF ROMANIAN ARCHEOLOGY

Bucharest ERA SOCIALISTA in Romanian No 13, 5 Jul 81 pp 28-30

[Article by Dr Radu Harhoiu of the Institute of Archeology in Bucharest]

[Text] The problems of social-political and economic life on the territory of our country at the beginning of the first millen um, particularly during the period following the withdrawal of Roman authorities to the southern Danube, were studied in detail decades ago. Traces of uninterrupted inhabitance were found in the space which always belonged to the natives and independent forms of their existence were stated precisely under the harsh conditions created by penetration of the migrating populations into the Geto-Dacian hearth. On the basis of many archeological discoveries made in the years of socialism, it also was possible to outline aspects of the relations between the natives and the migrators, with important contributions being made to an understanding of the Dacian-Roman continuity in the Carpathian-Pontic-Danubian area and, indirectly, to an explanation of these interdependent complex phenomena at the European level.

Whereas in the years of socialism, research into our people's past achieved important progress, however it is no less true that there still are a number of gaps in the scientific information accumulated. This in particular is due to the momentary stage of research, that is, to the fact that all the sources existing on the territory of ancient Dacia could not be explored exhaustively or that, in some cases, all the conclusions which can be drawn from the material research were not drawn. For example, few people know that the first archeological sites in Romania dedicated to researching some of the basic aspects of the Romanian people's story were opened only toward the end of the 50's or that only in the last decade was sustained activity reached at other similar sites, which meant that the number of archeological complexes would reach more than a hundred discoveries about the 3d-7th century A.D.

The colloquium of researchers in the area of the country's archeology and history during the period of the first millenium, which took place in Tirgu Mures between 16-19 April 1981, with the subject "The Continuity of the Native Population in the Carpathian-Danubian-Pontic Area and Its Relations With Some of the Migrating Populations," concentrated its attention on five big subjects concering the demographic realities of deep significance which existed in that era on the territory of our country.

A first subject discussed was the continuity of the native population on the territory of the former province of Dacia in the 6th century. An important element in the "file" of this subject was the analysis of written information on evacuation of the province of Dacia (271-275). A critical examination of the literary sources

led to the conclusion that the sources should not be interpreted "ad litteram." They present the event from the viewpoint of the Roman imperial ideology, which was seeking to justify the abandonment of Dacia as a political act demanded by the situation of that time, which would have led to a total evacuation which would not have abandoned the inhabitants of the province to the barbarians. Actually, merely a partial abandonment took place, with only the authorities, army and part of the urban population leaving the province. There are no indirect sources (edicts, laws, inscriptions) or archeological documents proving the actual exodus of the population and, as a result, a massive demographic increase to the right of the Danube at that date, which would have had to occur if a "total" evacuation had taken place. When such an event is produced, a classic example being the move of the Visigoths to the right of the Danube in the year 376, the sources of the era record it promptly and with a wealth of details.

Proceeding from these observations of domestic criticism of written information, the problem was posed of to what extent archeological research reflects this picture or not. A direction of the investigation was guided toward an analysis of the activity of the former urban centers of Dacia. In most of these centers researched until now, it was possible to find a habitat on the path of ruralization of the local population. For the time being there are rather few of these results, since in the case of older research it was preferable many times to follow the imposing Romanian complexes to the detriment of this fragile place, one which was of capital importance for us. So, an orientation would be needed predominantly of the archeological research in the urban centers toward the habitat characteristic of the 4th century. The results existing until now--from Apulum, Sarmizegetusa, Potaissa, Napoca and so forth--must be studied more thoroughly, completed and corroborated.

In exchange, a research and analysis of the settlements in the rural environment permitted a clearer understanding of the continuity of the Roman provincial population both in the old settlements as well as some established following abandonment. We have available a quantity of informative material, richer and richer as the days go by, which permits the formulation of sometimes more circumstantial conclusions. But in order to explain this facies in all its complexity, it would be useful to have the existence of annotated catalogues of the discoveries (settlements, burial places, isolated discoveries, coins, paleochristian pieces and so forth) between the year 275 and the end of the 4th century, comprised according to international scientific standards. Only in this way will this pertinent information become accessible to the scientific world and can it become convincing. Also it is clear that archeological research would gain if it would direct more attention to the habitats with their complex problems, giving up minor and disseminated investigations.

An element of major importance in defining the customs of the native population in the former province of Dacia in the 4th century is the funeral rite and ritual. In the current stage of research one can document the continuing use of former provincial necropoles (for example, Cluj-Napoca, Turda-Potaissa). On the other hand, it was possible to identify and define the burial customs of the population from the rural environment, as illustrated to a large extent by the necropolis No 1 in Bratei. The information obtained in these two cases can be made complete by making the research more thorough and extending it to other regions in Transylvania and Oltenia. At the same time, the need is felt for more fine methods in order to individualize the rite and ritual demonstrations characteristic of the population which, actually, had burial customs at that time with harmless funeral catalogue but which differ from the funeral rite and ritual of the migrating populations. This objective situation is not limited just to the former province of Dacia but is a general European

phenomenon caused, among other things, by the transition to Christianity by the populations in the provinces of the empire.

Significant aspects on the continuity were revealed in Banat, where archeological discoveries confirm that the late Roman fortifications continued to operate a long time along the Danube and where monetary circulation proves an intense economic life by the large quantities of bronze coins used.

Also, in Oltenia, fortresses along the Danube continued to be used until the first decades of the 5th century. Then following a short period of interruption during the 5th century, they were repaired and used in the first half of the 6th century. This state of affairs proves the political-economic position of the Roman-Byzantines in the first half of the 4th and first half of the 6th centuries and their determination not to give up the Danube or the territories belonging to it along the left bank. One of the effects of this situation was the fact that--even if for short intervals--the locals from the former province could regain sociocultural contacts with the Roman-Byzantine population on the right Danube, which permitted to a certain extent a strengthening of their difficult position. With regard to Oltenia, although research of the territory still is at its beginnings, it can be affirmed that the results of archeological investigations in Locusteni-Gropani and Gropsani-Olt have permitted identification of the cultural characteristics of the native population in the 4th century.

A second big subject discussed was the continuity of the native population of Moldavia and Muntenia in the 4th century.

As we know, as a result of the Goths' movement toward the regions in the northern Black Sea and from the Lower Danube at the end of the 3d and beginning of the 4th centuries, an apparently united culture in its general features was born over an extended area between the Olt and Dnepr however it was not united in a number of particular aspects: the Cerneahov-Sintana culture of the Mures. One of the basic problems concerning us in this framework is the contacts and relations between the culture mentioned and the culture of the free Dacians, in the case of the Carps, dating mainly in the 3d century. Although in a number of archeological situations somewhat of an interruption was observed in the cultural evolution during the 3d century (which in a certain stage of research permitted the hypothesis of a cesura of residence) today, following accumulation of new discoveries and, at the same time, use of a more improved working method, it has been possible to show the continuity of indigenous demonstrations and even more, some typical local customs within the culture of Sintana de Mures. In other words, at the moment, besides the Gothic and Sarmatic composition in the particular demonstrations of this culture, a clearly native one also is formed.

Undoubtedly, publication of the two big plots of recent discoveries will contribute to a broader and more complex knowledge of this mixed cultural facies: the Carpic necropolis with around 650 graves in Valeni (Neamt County), dating to the 3d century, as well as the vast necropolis with its settlement like Sintana de Mures, from Valea Seaca (Vaslui County) from the 4th century. In this way, the permanence of the Dacian-Roman element in the particular period, currently proven in particular indirectly through the presence of ceramics attributed generally to the free Dacians, as, for example, the Carps, can be demonstrated on a much more solid documentary base. A certain type of ceramic or object restricted zonally cannot offer sufficient foundation for an ethnosocial determination. A well-based analysis of

various types of customs (costume, burial), of cataloguing and so forth can lead much further. From this viewpoint, the two necropoles and the settlement mentioned are an inestimable treasury of information.

The discussions also analyzed the characteristics of the culture of the free Dacians in western Romania. Many archeological discoveries made in this zone of the country, particularly the complex at Mediesul Aurit (Satu-Mare County) has permitted a much more exact definition of the population mentioned. The appearance of elements characteristic of the Przeworsk culture during the 3d century are integrated into a general phenomenon characteristic of the zone from the middle Danube, the cause for which should be sought in the disturbances of certain ethnic groups caused by macromanic wars. It is important that the Germanic elements penetrating our land do not affect the cultural background of the free Dacians; on the contrary, they had a contribution not lacking in importance over the demonstrations within the Przeworsk culture (for example, the introduction of the potter's wheel in the second half of the 3d century).

A third big subject for the colloquium in Tirgu Mures referred to the Sintana de Mures culture, attributed years before to the Goths. Clearly it has resulted that various types of customs (costume, forms of rite and ritual) as well as various forms of housing reflect a polyethnic culture, a fact also proven by the ancient sources. In a monograph dedicated to the history of the Goths which appeared recently ("Geschichte der Goten," Munich, 1979), the Austrian professor, Herwig Wolfrom, shows very convincingly that the different versions of the Gothic nation (Gutons, Gotitervings, Greutings, Visigoths, Ostrogoths) actually are stages of migration accompanied by phenomena of aculturation in the immigration areas, where a determining role belonged to the native populations over which the Goths settled. Within this broad and diverse process, the role of the native Dacian-Roman population, in this case from Moldavia and Munteia, takes on particular importance.

With regard to the period of demonstration of the Sintana de Mures culture, the conclusion has been reached that the earliest stage may be established around the year 300, while the higher chronological limit corresponds to the last decades of the 4th century. At the same time, it has been defined that the area of spread of the particular culture does not affect Oltenia (Lower Dacia), while with regard to the intra-Carpathian Dacia its penetration may be determined only in the second half of the 4th century, with this not changing the cultural background of the local population.

After the end of the 4th century, it is possible to record the continuation of certain cultural aspects related with the Sintana de Mures culture but which, through their internal structure, may be attributed to a great extent to the Roman population.

The continuity of the natives' housing in the 5th century established the fourth big subject discussed. Throughout central and eastern Europe, the penetration of the ethnic congolomerate headed by the Huns caused serious ethnic disturbances. Archeologically, the situation in the zones mentioned is carried out by a considerable thinning out of significant traces. Except for some complexes attributed to the Huns or Alano-Ostrogoths,the other discoveries are few and hard to decipher. Clearly, this general archeological situation also to a certain extent has been expressed on the territory of our country. Yet, recently, both in Transylvania as well as outside the Carpathians, a number of settlements have been identified recently which date either to the end of the 4th century and beginning of the 5th century or toward the end of the 5th century: Bratei (Sibiu County), Sighisoara (Mures County), Soporu de Cimpie (Cluj County) in Transylvania; Ciresanu and Tirgsor (Prahova County) in Muntenia; Costisa (Neamt County) in Moldavia. The still small number of these

discoveries cannot be interpreted automatically as a result of a historical reality, since, undoubtedly, in many regards it reflects the current stage of research. Links between the complexes which can be dated to the beginning or to the last decades of the 5th century will be able to be found in the future through rsystematic investigation. An important step forward thin the problem concerning ius can be made by intense research of microregions, characterized by intense housing. Promising prospects are seen in Tirgsor and Budureascar (Prahova County) in Muntenia, Bratei or Sighisoara in Transylvania and Davideni (Neamt County) and Costisa in Moldavia.

On the other hand, certain relations between the cultural heritage of the 4th century and that characteristic of the 6th century show that the native Dacian-Roman element was present without interruption in the zone mentioned. Publication of the results obtained following digs done in various archeological complex in this age can lead to more solid conclusions on the aspects mentioned.

Another big subject for the colloquium was the continuity of the native population in the 6th-8th centuries.

The results of archeological research in Transylvania, along with identification of Germanic archeological complex (necropoles and settlements), have permitted definition of various forms of ethnocultural demonstration of the Romanized Dacians even in the residences attributed to the Germanics, as proven graphically, among other ways, by the Moresti archeological complex. Also, the demographic rise found in the first half of the 7th century (the number of graves nearly quadruples) may be explained only by a greater archeological expressiveness of the local residents, as an effect of living together and mutual influences between the native and migrating populations. A similar phenomenon also is found in other former provinces of the empire (Gallia, Germany). Appropriate utilization of the results of the research done within the necropoles in Bratei and Noslac (Alba County) as well as picking up the research at the Unirea necropolis (Alba County) again will make important statements on this problem.

With regard to the penetration of the Avars into Transylvania, the conclusion has been reached that they were able to settle approximately around the year 680 and only in a region restricted along the middle course of the Mures.

An important observation which may be made on the basis of our current knowledge on the period of the 6th-7th centuries is that a number of phenomena on the outer Carpathian territories were produced which were similar to those in Transylvania and that these phenomena, against a common ethnic background, are related to the ethnocultural demonstrations appearing in the zones mentioned even in the 5th century.

During the current stage of our information, we do not know one habitat in Oltenia which could be attributed to a migrating population during the 6th century. The few foreign discoveries are totally isolated and refer to the 7th century. Important research from Craiova, in the Facai and Fintina-Obedeanu zones as well as the ones in Gropsani-Olt present forms of the cultuere of the local population and its ties with the Byzantine Empire during the 6th-7th centuries.

The research done in recent years in Muntenia and Moldavia has brought out the originality of the forms of archeological expression of the local population's culture.

Digs from Budureasca,Tirgsor, Baleni-Romani (Dimbovita County), Sima (Prahova County) and Dulceanca (Teleorman County), in Muntenia, Davideni, Suceava-Sipot in Moldavia d cument a chronological level specific to the 6th century, characterized, among other things, by an advanced pottery-making technique, the practice of the craftsmen and of agriculture. This cultural facies is clearly different from the forms of archeological demonstration of the Slavs from the upper Dnepr, culturally very different. The first demonstrations of Slavic culture in their primary form are found on the territory of our country toward the second half of the 6th century, while more certain dating is restricted just toward the end of that century. This situation, for example, is also found in Poland. Together with rise in the elements of culture characteristic of the Slavs, a cultural regression also is observed.

Participants in the Tirgu Mures colloquium gave special attention to the results obtained in the station of Sighisoara-Catunul Viilor. Here, on the right bank of the Tirnava Mare River, immediately neighboring on the municipality of Sighisoara, a native settlement very probably from the last decades of the 3d century has been found. In other words, not much after the province of Dacia ceased to be administered by the Romans. Inhabitance on the same spot also continues in the 4th century, then in the next century and does not interrupt even in the period of the 6th-8th centuries. The 60 archeological complexes discovered until now (homes with ovens or hearths, household pits and so forth) together with their remarkable inventory bring new and important information to the documenting of the phenomenon of the continuity of the Dacian-Roman population. This successive inhabitation throughout the 3d-8th centuries is in a rich zone of discovery from the period of formation of the Romanian people: Just 30 km downstream on the Trinava Mare is an important inhabitation of Bratei, while field research in the area of Sighisoara has identified inhabitation in the period which concerns us. In this way, the Sighisoara microzone seems to be, in Transylvania, one of the most important areas from the period of formation and crystalization of the Romanian people, currently being the subject for broad interdisciplinary research. This research must take place at the broadest possible level by attracting a greater number of specialists. In general it should be stressed that the complex microzonal research is able to offer us a clearer picture of the phenomenon of the continuity of the natives. Due to the increase in population and system for cultivating the land or other economic reasons, the settlements from the 3d-8th centuries are characterized by a certain mobility within a microzonal stability. From this viewpoint, the realities from the Sighisoara zone seem to be relevant.

The documented reports and discussions carried out along with them during the Tirgu Mures colloquium certainly have made important contributions to bringing out important aspects in the history of the Romanian people, to a more detailed knowledge of their various relations with certain migrating populations. Proceeding from the results obtained and with the goal of deepening the scientific research of the country's history, it was decided to organize other discussions on the Carpatho-Danubian-Pontic area in the period of the 4th-8th centuries, discussions to take place in the future.

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KOSOVO LEADER VLASI INTERVIEWED ON CAUSES OF CRISIS

Belgrade NEDELJNE INFORMATIVNE NOVINE in Serbo-Croatian No 1598, 16 Aug 81 pp 8-11

[Interview with Azem Vlasi, president of the Kosovo Provincial Conference of the SAWP, by Aleksandar Novacic; date and place not specified]

[Text] Azem Vlasi, chairman of the Kosovo Provincial Conference of the SAWP and until recently a member of the Kosovo Provincial Party Committee, a lawyer by education, was born in 1948. Vlasi is known to the Yugoslav public mainly as the dynamic former president of the Youth League.

Today Vlasi is one of the key political figures in Kosovo, very much involved in the struggle being waged by progressive forces in that province.

"I look with optimism on the process of consolidation of the situation in Kosovo, since the League of Communists and the other progressive forces have finally adopted a strategy for permanent stabilization. To a great extent a new awareness has now become prevalent, above all among party members, concerning the true causes of the 'events in Kosovo,' concerning nationalism, technobureaucracy and other adverse phenomena. And what is most essential, it has become clear to people that this course must be pursued to the end by the League of Communists if conditions are to become stable, since there is no alternative or other way. No one can live any longer in any suspense and say: Well, if we succeed, that will be fine, and if not, perhaps some solution will be found that will be better....

"There simply is no alternative."

[Question] Perhaps this is the first optimistic statement by a leader from Kosovo, or it is at any rate a fairly rare one, one that was made without hesitation and with strong inner conviction. We asked Vlasi to begin the interview by summing up what had been achieved in Kosovo over the last 4 months. To comment on his judgment that the "results are evident, but the situation is still complicated...."

[Answer] The first result lies in the greater awareness of the working people and citizens of Kosovo concerning the true character and nature of the hostile and counterrevolutionary activity. We have managed to expose and clarify the

goals of all the forces which were preparing an attempt at counterrevolution. This was achieved thanks to the intensive and well-organized sociopolitical campaign, which was indispensable. We would not have been able to achieve the victory without the support of the enormous majority of the population.

Later, as time went on, we entered a struggle which is very complicated and difficult, since it is necessary to eliminate all the causes which over a long period of time resulted in the events in Kosovo.

[Question] How is the support of the majority of the population for the new policy manifested?

[Answer] In various ways. I would point to the high level of politicization of the masses. We live in an exceptional atmosphere in which every citizen is closely following everything that is happening, every action, every move we make.... Everything that is being written or said about Kosovo.

[Question] Nevertheless, the situation is still judged to be complicated?

[Answer] Yes, since in essence we are talking about a hostile action which was prepared for a long time, one into which various forces were drawn over a lengthy period of time, along the line of Albanian nationalism and irredentism. Those forces forged a conspiracy against Yugoslavia and were waiting for that X day, as experts in matters of security put it, which for those forces was the period after Tito's death. It would be unrealistic to expect that we would be able to quickly repair the situation regardless of the intensity of the action....

[Question] It is being said that the enemy is changing his tactics.

[Answer] We have cut short the activity such as demonstrations or street disorders and suppressed it. But hostile action is continuing through other forms and in other ways. For example, deliberate misinformation is being spread, slogans are written....

[Question] Is this on a large scale?

[Answer] We have quite reliable figures that these slogans are being written by small organized groups at various places in order to give the public the impression that it has some dimension, as though a large number of people were involved. That is not the case.

Our economic problems, our real problems, are being used in the misinformation which is being spread. The hostile forces are spreading pessimism, a feeling of futility, especially in connection with the economic difficulties that Yugoslavia now faces. It is clear, then, that along with continuing the action against the hostile forces, we must vigorously undertake to resolve the acute problems of our social development.

The greater the speed and effectiveness with which we do this, the more successful we will be in achieving stabilization of the political situation as a whole. Here we proceed on the premise that there is no consolidation of political conditions in Kosovo without achieving economic stabilization, overall improvement of the situation in the economy and society, and advancement of the relations of socialist self-management....

[Question] One of the slogans which is still relevant is "Kosovo a Republic." Where did that slogan come from, and how is it that that slogan emerged?

[Answer] The character of our system and relations within the country are such that the preconditions have been created for the full national affirmation of all the nationalities and ethnic minorities. From that standpoint the slogan "Kosovo a Republic" is invented and artificial. The main slogan of our system is: power to the workingman, and not power to the Federation or to the republic, to the district or to the opstina. No one can say today that the provinces are in a subordinate position, that within Serbia and Yugoslavia they cannot exercise rights just like the other nationalities and ethnic minorities in the republics.

The nationalistic forces deliberately launched this slogan, expecting that this slogan would be acceptable to a certain number of people and they would not see it as an aspiration to break up Yugoslavia, nor a step toward Kosovo's separation. It is becoming clearer and clearer to people what the forces behind that slogan are after. In any case, that slogan offers a different class concept, one that proceeds from the positions of dogmatism and Stalinism.

I should also say that the slogan "Kosovo a Republic" did not emerge as the only and isolated slogan, but was lumped together with other anti-Yugoslav and anti-self-management slogans, which in fact exposes its nature.

Full equality and freedom of the nationalities and ethnic minorities is not realized on the basis of republic or provincial boundaries, but on the foundations of the system of socialist self-management, the class commitment of socialist ideology, policy and relations.

Personnel Changes and Responsibility

[Question] How do you evaluate the major personnel changes in Kosovo which have now been rounded out in the radical changes in the Provincial Party Committee?

[Answer] When we undertook the differentiation, we inevitably realized that specific individuals were responsible for the specific situation. Either they bore personal responsibility, or, if I can put it that way, they bore objective responsibility, since they occupied prominent po[illegible]

There was a need to measure both the individual and the collective responsibility, which we did in fact do. The public was informed about this, and I can say that these personnel changes are truly important and that they have covered all the structures and levels in the province.

[Question] There was probably also resistance to these changes.

[Answer] I cannot say that there was any organized resistance. But there were certain manifestations that were consequences of a lack of understanding on the part of individuals and certain collective bodies.... In actuality, they did not understand the level of responsibility for the situation of which the enemy took advantage, the problems that had been unresolved for years.... But I think that this responsibility should certainly be distinguished from direct responsibility for hostile actions and also from the responsibility of people who had a duty in the field of education and in similar institutions.

As for the responsibility of individuals who held sociopolitical functions, I think that this has been realistically measured, and they have contributed by their self-critical attitude to successful performance of the process of differentiation.

[Question] Does the impression that this has gone slowly nevertheless still prevail with a portion of the public?

[Answer] More essential than that, I think, is that we did not have political deserters. I am certain that many people who had to leave their posts will remain and within the limits of their opportunities will be useful and will remain on the line of the League of Communists.

[Question] It is thought by some that the differentiation went slowly because there are not enough personnel in Kosovo who could replace the team that was previously in power. In other words, that there is a deep personnel gap.

[Answer] Perhaps such arguments have been made, but they are basically unacceptable. First of all because the present actions which we are conducting have shown that there are a large number of party members and others in Kosovo who are ready to undertake an open campaign against the hostile forces. One thing is true: For years, and not just in Kosovo, we have been favoring tendencies which have been narrowing the personnel base. We have always cast our eyes on one and the same group of people in high positions. All the shuffling of personnel came from them, which was a mistake. Nevertheless, in the campaign which we are waging we have discovered a number of people able and willing to carry on the new political line. That is, the personnel do exist, but they need to be given an opportunity to show what they can do....

Too Much Verbalism

[Question] Can it be said that the tendencies which erupted in Kosovo are also present in other communities of our country and that there was a break in Kosovo because that link was weakest?

[Answer] If we are to speak about the deeper causes which favored the strengthening of nationalism in Kosovo, we must examine trends and occurrences more broadly in the country. For a long time now, for example, we have been faced with the tendency toward exclusiveness both in the economy and in other fields.

This could result in nationalistic occurrences within the republics and provinces.

This has been condemned in political forums, but in all of this there is too much verbalism. When the causes that result in exclusiveness are examined in more detail, one comes upon the fact that this is sponsored to the greatest degree by the tie-up between the technobureaucracy and the political bureaucracy. I think that no one in this country believes that such exclusiveness is favorable to associated labor. On the contrary, work organizations are fighting fiercely against this, but the technobureaucracy and political bureaucracy are driving associated labor, are simply forcing it toward exclusiveness, which could be dangerous in many ways.

[Question] Are those the roots of nationalism?

[Answer] Yes, but we have been inclined to underestimate it and we have been quicker to note and issue warnings about "that other" nationalism rather than the nationalism in our own community.

We have done much to set ourselves apart from one another, to shut ourselves off from one another, we are spreading an atmosphere of self-sufficiency even in culture, in creativity, in education.... Take education as an example. We have awkwardly rounded out eight systems of education and in practice we make it impossible for young people from one province or republic to continue their schooling in other communities. We have posed thousands of problems and erected thousands of barriers. And this has had the result that young people have the feeling that everyone is sufficient unto himself in his own republic or province.

We have to take as our point of departure that Yugoslavia is a natural community created by the common will and through a common struggle, on the basis of the common interests of all the nationalities and ethnic minorities. Accordingly, nothing that happens in one part of the country can be an isolated case which does not concern the other parts of the whole. Wherever something happens, this objectively has its roots in contradictions which, at least partially, are uniform and characteristic of the entire country.

[Question] It is not just Kosovo, then, that is exposed....

[Answer] It would be an illusion to believe that Kosovo is alone in being exposed to the contradictions which resulted in the escalation of nationalism. There are many problems and contradictions which represent potential causes of similar manifestations in other communities.

On the basis of everything that happened in Kosovo, we should all draw certain lessons, though it is clear that a single negative tendency need not manifest itself in the same way in all communities. But if we examine more deeply the causes of everything that is leading toward the destabilization of our community, regardless of whether it involves nationalism and anarcholiberalism or something else, we can always exposed to the dangers of a tie-up between various

domestic and foreign forces which are objectively working against that kind of Yugoslavia.

[Question] You are speaking about the lessons of Kosovo for Yugoslavia as a whole?

[Answer] We in Kosovo have drawn lessons which apply to many periods of time and to many issues. It is not just a question of nationalism. We suddenly understood that we cannot live so comfortably, in the belief that nothing can happen to us. And as for the entire country, I hope that we have drawn the lessons related to the role of the League of Communists as the leading ideological force. The LCY must strengthen its unity in the base, democratic centralism, since in difficult moments, and even generally, the League of Communists is the force that eyes turn to. Of course, the campaign cannot be carried on by party members alone, but the mobilization of the broad masses depends on how the League of Communists guides that campaign and whether it is up to its tasks. Here again we have drawn lessons in Kosovo, but on the basis of that our entire community and the entire League of Communists have also drawn lessons.

[Question] As a former president of the Youth League, how do you explain the fact that the young generation came under a high degree of influence of nationalism in Kosovo?

[Answer] I would first like to say that the number of young people who consciously became involved in hostile activity, recognizing clearly the goals and intentions of the organizers, is really not great. In that we are fortunate. However, we must be disturbed by the fact that the young people did nevertheless become involved, though only partially, in that kind of activity, even though they were unaware of the kind of game they had become involved in. This category is primarily made up of those young people who are confronting various problems and difficulties on an everyday basis, who are looking for answers, but not getting them. We have been working a bit with them, we have done a bit to improve their social status, their uncertainty about jobs and the like. This remains one of our chief tasks.

We have harbored too many illusions to the effect that since we are a democratic, socialist and self-managing society, this will automatically mean that young people will be brought up properly. It has turned out not to be the case, and nationalism knew how to take advantage of that.

I would also say that nationalism is basically a class enemy and that it should be treated as such, regardless of the ethnic community in which it occurs. It always goes against the foundations of our community, against brotherhood and unity. There is no well-intentioned nationalism, no nationalism that is more or less dangerous, but if we have to make some distinction, then it is only that the nationalism of a majority ethnic community in a community is nevertheless the most dangerous, since it directly jeopardizes the interests of those other nationalities and ethnic minorities in that community, who are in the minority. Taken as a whole, every nationalism is equally dangerous to our community.

[Question] To return to the problems of young people. What is the way out of the present difficulties, as you see it? Tens of thousands of people are graduating or have graduated from higher educational institutions, mainly in the humanities, and they have no opportunity to find jobs in the province.

[Answer] Their prospects for employment are not good, to be sure. Everywhere more people are deciding to study the social sciences than are needed. In the process of planning personnel we must combat that tendency. Second, there is a need for reorientation and indeed retraining of young people for occupations and specialties which are in demand even today and of which there is a shortage in both Kosovo and Yugoslavia.

I think that this problem can be solved quickly. This must also be accompanied by a restructuring of the economy, of investments, by an orientation toward tertiary activity, toward agriculture.... This is not a job which can be accomplished overnight. But I think that the main lines of development are fairly clear. This means a different distribution of investments than up to now, a distribution that would make provision for more jobs. Then, there is also a stronger orientation toward agriculture, toward faster exploitation of the natural resources of the province, the aid of the broader community is still necessary, but the channels through which it comes must be different, primarily through associated labor.

On the Writing of the Press

[Question] We would like to hear your opinion about the writing of the press and in general about the job which the news media have done in connection with the events in Kosovo. I think there is no need to issue a reminder that recently there has been quite a bit of argument over these matters.

[Answer] When all that happened, we saw that we were also unorganized with respect to the press, as indeed in certain other areas. To put it simply, the mechanisms failed, and this was not the fault of the news media alone. Later, and over this entire period, it was better, since there was quite a bit of news from Kosovo, an abundance of news about everything that happened and what was done and is being done by the organized socialized forces.

I think that the news media should continue to be very much involved in informing the public about the campaign being conducted in Kosovo. But I would like to say that there have also been articles which were not on the line of the League of Communists of Kosovo, the League of Communists of Serbia or the LCY, and there were articles as well which did more harm than good....

I am not in favor of us becoming concerned with those articles at this point, nor of getting into a discussion of those articles which, we might say, are irresponsible. Instead of that, it is much better to examine what line of commitment by newsmen will objectively and directly promote the process of stabilizing conditions and favor the efforts of the progressive forces in the province and throughout the country.

I have already said that an amazing politicization of the masses has been created and that every word, every article, is followed closely and analyzed. You can imagine that in this situation every failure, every unobjective piece of reporting, essentially represents pouring oil on the fire. Certain articles carried utterances of those with whom the LCY had settled accounts even earlier, forces which judged that their moment had come, that they could reactivate certain of their arguments and views....

[Question] Would you please give an overall assessment of the writing of the press about Kosovo?

[Answer] In their frankness and public presentation of the problems, the news media have been helpful to the socialized forces in Kosovo in winning the battle which has begun. I think that because of certain unacceptable articles the sources of news cannot now be shut off, nor should any campaign be conducted to criticize the press. There are still less grounds for doing this across the board and on the basis of certain divisions which are not valid.

On the contrary, the sources of information should be opened still more, and that greater openness should always be accompanied by greater responsibility and responsiveness to the real political situation and a sense of the need for what could truly help the consolidation. I am not in favor of dressing things up, of making them look better, I am not in favor of keeping things quiet because they are difficult, because they represent something that is not good in our practice or in our present campaign, but the principal preoccupation of both the news media and others must be the interest in stabilizing the situation, the interest of brotherhood and unity, the interest of strengthening mutual trust.

After all, in all difficult situations, this one included, in our Yugoslavia the decisive thing has been that mutual trust among our nationalities and ethnic minorities. Wherever anything unpleasant has happened, the progressive forces from that community have found support in the progressive forces and efforts of people from other communities.

In that context it meant a great deal to us in Kosovo that we had the sincere support of both the working class and all the working people and citizens, members of all the nationalities and ethnic minorities all over our country. That fact is contributing a great deal to the stabilization of the situation. We are encouraged in our actions when we also have the support of the news media in our efforts and in the struggle which is now being waged by the League of Communists of Kosovo and by the progressive forces in the province.

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CSO: 2800/342

KOSOVO PAPER REPORTS ON CONTINUING 'DIFFERENTIATION'

[Editorial Report] The 13 August 1981 issue of the Pristina daily RILINDJA (page 7) reported that in Istok Opstina 43 people had been expelled from the LC (largely from the villages of Kovrage and Prigoda where the basic LC organizations have been dissolved), including three from the Opstina LC Conference, three heads of LC Conference commissions, and seven secretaries of basic LC organizations in this opstina (the latter, for failing to take "necessary action" in condemning the demonstrations). Also, 10 workers, including 6 teachers from the "Vellezerit Ribar" secondary school, were suspended and disciplinary procedures opened against seven others at this school where over 80 have now been identified as demonstration participants. No information has been forthcoming as yet, it was reported, regarding the cutting down of 64 fruit trees belonging to two Serbian families in Kashica and Kovrage. "Serbian nationalism has taken various forms recently" in the opstina. Two Serbian youths in Crkolez set fire to animal feed on the farm of Vukomir Tijanic "in order to start a conflict between the Balaj and Tijanic families who are living as good neighbors."

In another report from Istok Opstina which appeared in the 5 September 1981 issue (page 5) Bajram Vuthi, head of the Opstina LC Central Committee, said that the appearance of hostile slogans had increased recently; those responsible in Banja and Malo Dubovo "were discovered immediately. But in some areas action has not been satisfactory. The situation is still complicated in the villages of Kovrage, Tomoc [Tomance?], Trbuhovac, Crni Lug, etc., where border and more concrete ideological-political action must be intensified." Azem Vllasi, head of the Central Committee of the Kosovo SAWP, who attended the meeting from which the above report was taken, said "one must raise the level of information at the base, clarify the background of hostile slogans, such as "Kosovo republic," etc., behind which are hidden all hostile actions. Rigorous measures must be taken against the abuse of national symbols which contribute toward destroying inter-nationality relations."

The 13 August issue (page 9) said that in Presevo Opstina in Serbia proper on the Kosovo border 20 demonstration participants had thus far been identified (six of whom were sentenced to 30-60 days in prison) and four persons, on whom hostile material had been found, were expelled from the LC, even though "thanks to the vigilance and mobilization of Communists and other progressive forces, the enemy did not succeed in finding refuge or organizing hostile demonstrations in this opstina."

The 14 August issue reported (page 5) that in Glogovac Opstina 105 LC members had thus far been expelled for "passivity, opportunism, and failure to carry out necessary differentiation." Two basic LC organizations have been dissolved (in the "Marshal Tito" secondary school and the "Emin Duraku" elementary school in Orlate). Also, two teachers have been suspended from work, including nine secondary school professors for organizing and participating in demonstrations. "The enemy is seen in various hostile slogans appearing in some local communities in Orlate, Trpeza, Nekovce and other places."

RILINDJA of 16 August 1981 (page 2) reported that in Suva Reka Opstina 15 members had been expelled from the LC, five were given warnings and eight were given final warnings. Those expelled included the director of the "Jeta e Re" secondary school and secretary of the school's basic LC organization which has now been dissolved and replaced with new members. The 5 September issue (page 6) said that between 11 March and 31 August 32 party members had been expelled in this opstina, 41 had been given warnings, and 27 final warnings. It said all schools, including the above, had started on time and instruction was proceeding normally; and "no Serbian family or individual has recently moved out, but...according to Stanislav Andjelkovic, there are about 30 requests now pending to leave, but for purely social reasons, such as school, marriage, a job offer.... But up to now we have not approved any of these requests," he said.

In Orahovac Opstina, according to the 18 August issue (page 8), 16 members have up to now been expelled from the party and 10 have been given warnings in about 12 (named) villages, and the 12-member basic LC organization in the village of Maralija has been dissolved. Hostile slogans continue to appear in these places, it said, and in Zrze "propaganda material from Albania, typewriters, and other hostile propaganda matter were found." The opstina court has sentenced 27 persons, including 17 secondary school students, to 15-60 days in prison for participating in the demonstrations in Prizren, Pristina, and Suva Reka, and for trying to organize demonstrations in Malisevo, Orahovac and Ratkovac. Also, six teachers, an administrator, and a medical technician were fired for hostile action.

Both RILINDJA and JEDINSTVO (Pristina) have also been carrying numerous announcements of job openings for teachers at all levels, as well as for clerical help and an unspecified number of guards at the reformatory in Lipljan (RILINDJA 9 August 1981 p 15) and for a prison guard commandant, a physician, administrative workers, criminal technician, and teachers (18 openings in all), in addition to "an unspecified number of guards" at the Djurakovac section of the Pec district prison (RILINDJA 20 August 1981 p 16).

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CENTRIFUGAL, CENTRIPETAL TENDENCIES IN LCY ARGUED

Confederative or United Party

Belgrade NEDELJNE INFORMATIVNE NOVINE in Serbo-Croation No 1594, 19 Jul 81 pp 8-10

[Article by Stevan Niksic]

[Text] "We must definitely determine whether we are members of republic organization leagues of communists, in which case we should change our membership cards to show that, or we are members of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia...."

This question, recorded in the preceding issue of NEDELJNE INFORMATIVNE NOVINE, was posed by Sreten Petrovic at a session of the "ideological" commission of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Serbia, during recent discussions of international relations, following recent events in Kosovo. The same or a very similar question could be heard recently at a number of political gatherings, in discussions that basically were quite different.

Several months ago, at a session of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Bosnia and Hercegovina, there were warnings about "unacceptable tendencies toward federalization or even confederalization." At the time of the Kosovo events, the discussions at sessions of the highest party forums of that province, of Serbia and of the federation included many words on the responsibilities of party organs in the republics and provinces to the LCY as a whole. The theme of party unity has become very current, in a totally relevant way.

Last week at the session of the LCY Central Committee Commission for Organizational and Statutory Matters, several once again directed attention to the danger from "federalization" of the LCY. The purpose of this session was to formulate proposals for changes and additions to the LCY statute, which will be considered at the 12th Party Congress. Certain chapters of the statute will certainly be changed. First, after the death of comrade Tito, the LCY president, the LCY Central Committee passed temporary measures that established the organization and scope of operation, or the responsibilities, of the highest party agencies. Final decisions on those matters, however, can be approved only by a congress.

The commission will propose that the decisions be retained, i.e., a collective political executive council will remain at the "top" of the LCY, and the council

will be composed of representatives of the LCY organizations of each republic and province and one from the Yugoslav National Army. Certain details, however, may be somewhat different than in the present statute. Modalities and alternatives of specific decisions discussed at the commission session still have to be clarified by the LCY Central Committee Presidium. After that, proposed changes in the statute will probably be quickly sent for public debate, as required by existing regulations.

Within the debate on statute changes, there was also talk of the principle of democratic centralism. France Popit, president of the LCY Central Committee of Slovenia, noted that democratic centralism must remain as the basic principle for the relationships, organization and functioning of the party.

He further stated that is not only a statutory but also an essential principle, a key condition for the functioning of the political vanguard of the working class and thereby a condition for the further development of socialist self-management. Considering the current political situation, Popit at the very beginning of his presentation uttered a warning. "Naturally," he said, "statutory norms in themselves cannot either prevent or deflect tendencies to disunity or irresponsibility in implementing adopted policy."

"A Holy Alliance"

Dragomire Draskovic, a sociologist from Belgrade, added to Popit's evaluation. He regards "federalization" of the party as a real danger and said that attention must be paid to that during the formulation of provisions of the LCY statute. Specifically, Draskovic sees a "dialectical unity" between the principle of democratic centralism and the principle of negotiation and the seeking of agreement, but one cannot supplant the other. If negotiation and agreement-seeking were to be legalized in the LCY (as being done in political institutions) instead of being unified, the party would be transformed into a "confederation" of republican and provincial parties. In that context, he warned picturesquely about the danger that a "holy alliance of national bureaucracies" could rule the League of Communists of Yugoslavia.

In seconding Draskovic's evaluation, Popit asserted that such manifestations as "localism," "republican particularism" and the like do not come only from failure to respect the principle of democratic centralism in the party. He agreed, however, that "drowning communists in particularist interests" was a real danger and that the League of Communists must "rise about particularist interests and defend the mutual interest."

Slobodan Filipovic of Titograd at that occasion saw a great problem because "everyone passed judgment on himself" and there was not always sufficient readiness and ability to admit one's own weaknesses and omissions. He advocates having the work of individual party organizations evaluated "in all environments," even if such evaluations disagree with those "that we give ourselves." Filipovic is convinced that there would be no danger to the independencies of republican and provincial organizations and that, at the same time, it would be very helpful if the implementation of mutually agreed-upon policy were regularly evaluated in "higher" agencies than those today, as a rule evaluate themselves.

"The Leaders" and Their Ambitions

The Sarajevo journal OPREDELJENJA recently published a thematic discussion on democratic centralism in the LCY; once agin the dominant theme was "party federalism." Fuad Muhic said that the roots of the "party federalism" ideology appeared at the beginning of the 1970's, and coincided with the advent of the mass movement in Croatia and "liberalism" in Serbia. Considering that some elements of federalist or even confederalist behavior within the LCY are in current practice, Muhic warned of attempts to "achieve a legal theoretical articulation through demands for revisions of the principle of democratic centralism." Specifically, Muhic condemned the replacement ("substitution") of democratic centralism in the LCY by the principle of self-management negotiation and agreement-seeking. That, he said, would quickly spawn a platform of "party federalism," with prospects for "confederalism."

A definition of republic and provincial leagues as sovereign parties, which would replace the present definition of the LCY as a "revolutionary and unified organization and the leading ideological and political force," would be the start of the "decomposition of the LCY as a revolutionary, integrative and cohesive factor of the Yugoslave community," continued Muhic. "Negotiation and agreement--seeking, without a majority right to authoritiative action in crisis situations, would bring the very existence of Yugoslavia into question," he concluded. In his opinion, "federal party behavior is of a subjective nature and is identical with the ambitions of leaders and the desire to create 'one's own party' and 'one's own place in history'."

Franjo Kozul at the same meeting said that any damage to unity within the LCY "in the name of national equality" would eliminate its basic role in current Yugoslav society. He continued, "It would be realistic to hypothesize a situation where, without the League of Communists, we would already have several Yugoslavias, or states; instead of an integral community of peoples and nationalities, we would get a confederation or something similar; primarily, we would not have a self-management, unaligned socialist community of the type that we have been building since the revolution."

Hamdija Pozderac disagreed with the conflict of the principle of democratic centralism, which should prevail in the party, and the principle of negotiation and agreement-making on the basis of consensus in the delegate system. For him, "the highest form of democratic centralism is unity of decision," which excludes overruling a minority.

Pozderac went on, "At the level of the federation and in the party, there is a process of reaching agreement and reaching unanimous decisions."

Raif Dizdarevic differentiated between the two principles: "No social negotiation and self-management agreement-seeking can replace democratic centralism within the League of Communists. If things were to head in that direction, we would make the LCY into a debate club or something worse." Nevertheless, Dizdarevic recognizes the legitimacy of the principle of negotiation in the party but only in two circumstances: first, at the level of the federation and, the second, "within the framework of a republic that has autonomous provinces." In his opinion, everything

else should presuppose "democratic encounter of all opinions for the sake of taking a united position that must then be implemented."

In the March issue of OPREDELJENJA, Branko Mikulic, a member of the LCY Central Committee Presidium, said that "in this historical period the role of the League of Communists is still irreplaceable, not only as the leading ideological and political force but also as a cohesive factor in our society. The undermining of that unity and that role for the LCY will challenge the unity of Yugoslavia and attack all the achievements won by our joint struggling, under the leadership of our party."

The "Federalist" Tradition

In any case, federalization tendencies have a peculiar continuity in the history of Yugoslav communists. In all the statutes of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, or the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, from its first congress in 1919 until the eleventh in 1978, democratic centralism was recorded as one of the basic principles. (Only at the fourth congress in Dresden in 1928 did the delegates fail to approve a statute; rather the statutory materials were regulated by 2 resolutions.) The principle of democratic centralism was not, however, always interpreted the same way.

At the Fourth Party Conference, held in Ljubljana in 1934, a decision was adopted on the formation of national parties within the framework of the unified Communist Party of Yugoslavia. That decision was confirmed at the Split plenum of the Central Committee of the Yugoslav Communist Party in 1935. In April 1936, however, the party Central Committee session decided to analyze the resolutions of the Split plenum. It was concluded that the only way to achieve a policy of national equality would be to dissolve Yugoslavia.

That same year, in June, the famous Moscow consultation took place with the participation of Tito, Edvard Kardelj and Blagoje Parovic. Under Tito's influence, the position on party unity was revised and the decision of the Split plenum confirmed; that is, the CPY must be a unified party that would struggle for the realization of revolutionary goals within Yugoslavia as a whole. After that, Tito returned to the country, where he soon took over party leadership. Although it included a number of national parties (the Communist Party of Slovenia, the Communist Party of Croatia, and others later), the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, as a unified, revolutionary force under Tito's direction, prepared the revolution and led to victory.

"In the party or the LCY, there has always been strength and wise people," Mikulic said, commenting on the history of "federalistic tendencies." These people "rejected such tendencies as conservative, reactionary and counterrevolutionary. At this time as well, such tendencies, if eventually they emerge, will be rejected, for all republic and provincial LCY organizations have enough wise people who are capable and inclined to resist them."

In the lecture "International Relations within Yugoslavia," presented in the 1975-1976 school year at the Josip Broz Tito political school of the LCY in Kumrovec, Dr Dusan Bilandzic, a member of the LCY Central Committee of Croatia and professor at the department of political science in Zagreb, analyzed recent

"federalistic tendencies" in the LCY. He reminded the audience that the national question was discussed as an open question for the first time since the war at the Eighth LCY Congress in 1964. At that time, besides talk of "classic" nationalism, the discussion also touched unitarism. Bilandzic asserted that at the congress "no one disputed the theses of the LCY leadership, but they were not met with enthusiasm. The delegates were very reluctant to speak on these topics, they were probably caught off guard, because no discussion in such terms and with such content had been heard in the LCY for nearly 20 years."

Bilandzic considers that at the time of the constitutional changes of 1967 and 1968 (which emphasized the rights and responsibilities of republics and provinces), the "federalization of the LCY actually began as well. This factor established the direction for constitutional reform of the governmental structure of the federation that was to be put into effect in 1971."

On the same occasion, Bilandzic turned his attention to the tenth session of the Croatian LCY Central Committee, in January 1970, when it was decided that "unitarism as an ideology was the dominant political tendency and danger for the social development of Yugoslavia." Bilandzic said, "Such an assessment by the Croation Central Committee was not previously submitted for approval to the leagues of communists of other republics. That was the first time in the history of the LCY that, at the republic level, the direction of long-term Yugoslav development and its momentary problems and relations were discussed. This was received with great distrust by the Yugoslav public."

The Universal Significance of the Debate

Certain associations along this theme are suggested by the debate on the constitutional structure of the Socialist Republic of Serbia, following the Kosovo events. Although the provincial committee of the Vojvodina League of Communists on 2 July reached a different conclusion on this subject than in some discussions at sessions of the Serbian LCY Central Committee on 6 May and the LCY Central Committee session of 7 May, direct polemics on a public scene have been avoided. The rebuke is directed primarily at the press for "opening the subject for debate."

In expressly accepting only the paper presented at its fourteenth session, according to the public report from the Vojvodina LCY Central Committee session, the Serbian LCY Central Committee indirectly protested the discussions held in the 2 highest political forums of the republic and the federation concerning the constitutional structure of Serbia.

As early as the end of May, a session of the Serbian LCY Central Committee Presidium decided (and a task force formed to implement the decision) that a basis should be prepared in short order for discussion of relations within the League of Communists of Serbia. At the same time, "in the further building of community in the republic as a whole, there must be systematic and organized work to overcome the problems that appear in conscientious implementation of the constitution. For the League of Communists, it is essential that that discussion be conducted in a spirit of complete openess and adherence to principles, understanding and mutual trust."

The debate on democratic centralism in the LCY and on the application of the principle of negotiation and agreement-seeking, or "consensus" in the party, as well as the warnings on the danger of "federalization of the party," will certainly continue until the twelfth LCY Congress. Its significance will likely surpass the dimensions of discussions of some momentarily crucial themes of Yugoslav political life. Problems of democratic relationships in the party, the relationship between the majority and the minority, and similar themes have lived and been resolved in the workers' movement, from the time of Lenin until today. Certain communist parties in Western Europe have deserted that principle, which is tied to the name of Lenin in the workers' movement. They consider it antiquated in modern circumstances. Yugoslav communists, however, have their own, different view, which has not changed.

Last April, Stane Dolanc, a member of the LCY Central Committee Presidium, spoke on that topic in a lecture for the jubilee of the law school in Ljubljana: "Bureaucratic and dogmatic tendencies and conceptions of democratic centralism have, in fact, been predominant in the history of the labor movement; Yugoslav communists, regardless of the formally recorded principles of democratic centralism found in one way or another in statutory documents, have in their daily lives, both before the revolution and especially during the course of the revolution and immediately after, been first started to resist such tendencies subjectively and objectively."

Without denying that the danger of bureaucratic and dogmatic tendencies continues, he perceives that in practical life many still think it much easier and quicker to dispose of actual problems by discipline, central leadership and apparent unity. Dolanc asserted, "It is different with those who conscientiously wish to change the principle of democratic centralism into an instrument of centralism, unitarism and statism. There, of course, it is no longer a problem of democratic centralism, but a problem of the conception of the League of Communists role, the denial of our basic programmatic goals and, in essence, counterrevolutionary activity."

The statutory provisions on the position of the republic and provincial organizations of the League of Communists as individual organizations within the framework of the LCY are absolutely clear. Indeed, no one has even attempted to question that. The problem, however, is that the statutory norms do not always coincide with what happens in everyday practice; since there is general agreement that the statutory norms are good and should not be changed, something in everyday practice should be changed.

Democratization or Decentralization

Belgrade NEDELJNE INFORMATIVNE NOVINCE in Serbo-Croation No 1596, 2 Aug 81 pp 15-16

[Text] Is is permissible for internal LCY relations (democratic centralism) to be less democratic than relations within society (self-management socialist democracy)? On the eve of the Eighth Congress, the critics of democratic centralism were particularly insistent about that dilemma; as in all discussions on the history of the Yugoslav party, the issue was regarded as an artificial one, inasmuch as it separated democracy from centralism. That in itself would not justify placing the same question on the agenda today. Disintegrative processes in socioeconomic life and tendencies to party federalism seem unambiguously to point to the need for strengthening both democracy and centralism as essential preconditions for realizing the

the cohesive role of the LCY. The relationship between democratic centralism and self-management agreement-seeking and negotiation was recently put into a completely new form. These 2 principles are regarded as complementary, which means that they are neither mutually exclussive nor subsitutable for one another.

The Yugoslav constitution provides that, if in the Assembly Council of Republics and Provinces the delegates do not agree according to the established procedure, the Yugslav Presidium (by a majority) may pass a so-called temporary decision. In the same way in the delegate system, if the process of agreement-seeking and negotiations reaches a dead end and threatens to block the functioning of the system, a type of democratic centralism is employed as a corrective mechanism.

Analogously, if democratic centralism is practiced in the League of Communists as an organizing principle for the activities of communists and if decisions are approved by a majority, in optimal situations it will not be necessary to overrule. Specifically, in democratic discussion, if complete agreement and unity are achieved through negotiation and consensus, then there is neither a majority nor a minority; also there is no overruling. In such cases, in the League of Communists, negotiations and agreements take place so that every constructive debate always seeks final agreement of all participants, without the majority seeking to impose its position on the minority.

This view of democratic centralism and self-management negotiation as complementary categories is completely acceptable and theoretically interesting. Its practical shortcoming, however, is its validity exclusively for so-called extreme situations: extremely unfavorable ones, when representatives in the delegate system in the Council of Republics and Provinces cannot reach agreement, and extremely favorable, when through discussion communists in a party reach a unanimous decision without resorting to the authority of the majority.

Principles Being Tested

The protagonists of this view consider, on the other hand, that it is not only functional in extreme situations. They say, "The principle of negotiation and agreement consensus is legitimate in the party as well, but only at the level of the federation and within the framework of a republic with provinces. All other situations are subject to democratic centralism. At the top of the LCY--the Central Committee and Presidium--there is a provision for negotiation and agreement consensus as a procedure for reaching a decision."

Although we disagree with this interpretation, we consider it exceptionally supportive for the further course of pre-congress debates. Directly or indirectly it opens a whole series of questions of significance for our party life and other important considerations.

Would not the installation of the principle of self-management negotiation and agreement-seeking in the LCY, with the principle of democratic centralism, nevertheless question the latter? Instead of a single principle, we would have 2 parallel principles of relationships, organization and party functioning, which would be unprecedented in the international communist movement and would bring not inconsequential difficulties for preserving unity in the LCY.

If as proposed, however, these two principles did not function in parallel, but democratic centralism were a principle only for republic and provincial LCY organizations, while negotiation and agreement consensus were exclusively for the LCY Presidium and Central Committee, then the unity of the party would be unambiguously destroyed. The parts and the whole would not be organized in the same way. Specifically, a number of republican and provincial parties would be organized on the identical, classic Marxist-Leninist principle that has been valid throughout the LCY, but the top Yugoslav party organization would be a mere loose coordination.

Finally, what would happen when members of LCY agencies, such as the Central Committee or Presidium, fail to reach a consensus? Since democratic centralism would no longer be a next resort, or majority overruling, nor would there be any higher level that, like the Yugoslav Presidium relative to the Council of Republics and Provinces, could make at least a temporary decision, the League of Communists would be paralyzed, and its eight parts would begin to function independently of the others.

Any overruling against equality has already been rendered impossible by the personnel structure of the highest party agencies. The composition of the LCY Presidium and Central Committee include equal numbers of representatives of republic and provincial organizations regardless of the fact that the number of communists that they consist of is far from equal. The introduction of yet another mechanism, such as negotiation and agreement consensus, would thus be superfluous; not only would it undermine democratic centralism and thereby the homogeneity of the party ranks, but it would directly open the way for centrifugal tendencies in the LCY, under conditions in which we are constantly emphasizing the need for stronger integrative or cohesive roles for the LCY in society.

It remains to document the assertion that "negotiation and agreement-seeking already exist in the LCY Central Committee Presidium." To the degree that this is an expression of established unity of opinion among communists, reached by democratic debate, there is absolutely sufficient room for it within the framework of democratic centralism. To the degree that no dialogue would take place in the LCY Central Committee Presidium between the most distinguished activists who have the confidence of the overall membership just because they "had risen above particularist interests" (but rather the positions of republic and provincial organizations are brought to agreement through them), that would not be good. Class interest would be pitted against national and republic or provincial interests, or subordinated to them. That would lead to compromises, accommodations, compromise decisions, contention and the like. It would also be against the statutes, for at least in its proclaimed internal structure the LCY is a uniform organization; its leadership cannot be a collective of representatives of the party interests of individual republics, but rather a homogeneous body in which every member, no matter where he originates, represents the interests of the LCY as a whole.

If the truth be told, what is not good, can also exist in the League of Communists, at least as a tendency. It is not difficult to find examples that indirectly at least predict that perhaps negotiations and agreement processes will take place in the highest party structures; the unfavorable consequences can also be found.

Almost every week, film reports from sessions of the LCY Central Committee Presidium vividly show that members of the uniform leadership of the uniform party regularly sit in strictly separate groups by republic and provincial delegations. Furthermore, it is a true rarity (other than during celebrations and crisis situations) for a member of that same central LCY agency to address a broad political gathering in a republic or province that is not "his home." In the same way, it is striking that the mdeia devote markedly greater attention to addresses by "their own personnel" at central party tribunes, than to presentations by members of the same forums from other parts of the country. All that is true, although, at least according to the statute, no member of the LCY Central Committee or Presidium is a delegate of any republic or province, but rather each member's electoral party base consists of all the communists in the country. These obervations certainly are not sufficient to draw any conclusions, but they offer food for thought.

More Democracy--More Centralism

The thesis "the more democracy, the less centralism, and the obverse," is erroneously used to pit democratization and centralization against one another, for democratism in the LCY refers to the free, equal, active and direct involvement of the broadest membership in the creation of party policy, while centralism refers to uniform, firmly coordinated, consistent and disciplined implementation of what has been decided democratically (by a majority). The more democracy in the agreement process, the more centralism there will be in action, for the communists will not regard party positions as decrees imposed from above but as their own. The expansion of democracy to the process of implementing decisions would, however, lead to anarchy at the base, just as the transfer of centralism to the basis of decision-making would threaten absolutism by the highest party agencies. Decentralization or polycentrism in a uniform party such as the LCY, as defined in its statute, not only would not be an indicator of its democratization but on the contrary would represent party federalism tendencies.

The insistence on the absolute autonomy of republic and provincial party leadership as independent political centers in relation to the LCY organization and agencies is accompanied by militant repression of every dissonant voice at the base. It may appear that we are proposing absolute responsibility to the party for things outside its ranks, but that is not the case. In Kosovo, the line of differentiation was not party members opposed to nonparty members; rather; adversaries were divided equally into each of those categories. If not actively, at least by its passivity, the provincial LCY leadership contributed to the hostile activities. Most people, and especially the communists of Kosovo, were not infected by chauvinism and irridentism. We are publishing ever more direct reactions of workers, farmers and youth, as well as remarks by cultural creative artists, political workers and others, but the question arises as to why their voices were not heard earlier. That was certainly a consequence of the pressures that were exerted, and of their opportunism, but why at that time, as today, wasn't the Yugoslav public scene open to them (including the media, political forums, social tribunes and scholarly gatherings).

Here we reach the warning on the overall Yugoslave situation that emerges from the Kosovo events. That is the dangerous notion of political fair play in interrepublic and provincial relationships, and even within the LCY, according to which everything

becomes an internal matter of the concrete milieu, and any sort of interest "from outside" represented unprincipled interference, paternalism, hegemony, false solicitude and the like. Should one of them dare eventually to make a sound, any public means of information in the country that would publish anything would risk violating the rules of the game or damaging the principle of the peaceful coexistence of our regional narcissism.

Such extremely negative situations--no matter how good they may be as illustrations for theoretical argumentation that federalistic tendencies in the LCY are always the cause and the consequence of parallel violations of both democratic and centralist components of democratic centralism--are equally unfavorable as orientation points for political practice. In other words, it is risky to wait for these disintegrative processes in some segments of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia to reach a culminate before turning to decisive action. This is more true since our recent history shows that, when the opposition forces and ideologies (nationalism, liberalism or technocratism) attack, in extremely offensive form, on some narrow, peripheral zone, we never lack parallel symptoms of the same deviations in other environments, although at somewhat lower stages of development. In practical terms, in a certain way, and not only indirectly, the whole is always infected. At this particular moment, that is a symptom of a unique decentralization and de-democratization of democratic centralism and that naturally represents two sides of an identical process.

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